People's capacity to mentally simulate future events (episodic future thinking) as well as what could have occurred in the past but did not (episodic counterfactual thinking) critically depends on their capacity to retrieve episodic memories. All 3 mental simulations are likely adaptive in that they involve rehearsing possible scenarios with the goal of improving future performance. However, the extent to which these mental simulations are useful at a later time depends on how well they are later remembered. Unfortunately, little is known about how such simulations are remembered. In the current study, we explored this issue by asking participants to retrieve episodic memories and generate future and counterfactual simulations in response to 4 cues: particular places, people, objects, and times. A day later participants received 3 of the 4 cues and were asked to recall the remaining 1. Our results indicate that people and locations are equally well remembered, regardless of the temporal orientation of the mental simulation. In contrast, objects in future simulations are recalled less frequently than are those in memories. Time was poorly remembered across conditions but especially when remembering a future or a counterfactual simulation. In light of these results, we discuss how temporal information may be incorporated into our hypothetical episodic simulations.

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The neural reuse framework developed primarily by Michael Anderson proposes that brain regions are involved in multiple and diverse cognitive tasks and that brain regions flexibly and dynamically interact in different combinations to carry out cognitive functioning. We argue that the evidence cited by Anderson and others falls short of supporting the fundamental principles of neural reuse. We map out this problem and provide solutions by drawing on recent advances in network neuroscience, and we argue that methods employed in network neuroscience provide the means to fully engage in a research program operating under the principles of neural reuse.

the workshop on LocatingRepresentations in the Brain at Stanford University, and the meeting of the Deep South Philosophy and Neuroscience Workgroup at the Central APA. We thank the participants in these events for their feedback. We also thank the members of the Imagination and Modal Cognition lab at Duke University for many helpful discussions.

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