The Idaho National Laboratory, along with Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Idaho State University's Idaho Accelerator Center, are developing electron accelerator-based, photonuclear inspection technologies for the detection of shielded nuclear material within air-, rail-, and especially, maritime-cargo transportation containers. This paper describes a developing prototypical cargo container inspection system utilizing the Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) technology, incorporates interchangeable, well-defined, contraband shielding structures (i.e., "calibration" pallets) providing realistic detection data for induced radiation signatures from smuggled nuclear material, and provides various shielded nuclear material detection results. Using a 4.8-kg quantity of depleted uranium, neutron and gamma-ray detection responses are presented for well-defined shielded and unshielded configurations evaluated in a selected cargo container inspection configuration.

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We have measured differential (p,xn) cross sections, d 2 a/dQdE n , from thin targets and absolute neutron yields from stopping-length targets at angles of 7.5°, 30°, 60°, and 150° for the 113-MeV proton bombardment of elemental beryllium, carbon, aluminum, iron, and depleted uranium. Additional cross-section measurements are reported for oxygen, tungsten, and lead. We used time-of-flight techniques to identify and discriminate against backgrounds and to determine the neutron energy spectrum. Comparison of the experimental data with intranuclear-cascade evaporation-model calculations with the code HETC showed discrepancies as high as a factor of 7 in the differential cross sections. These discrepancies in the differential cross sections make it possible to identify some of the good agreement seen in the stopping-length yield comparisons as fortuitous cancellation of incorrect production estimates in different energy regimes.