This paper explores the role of the world wars in 20th century energy transitions, focusing on the growth of oil as a major energy source which accelerated after the Second World War in North America and Europe. We utilise the recently developed Deep Transitions framework which combines Techno-Economic Paradigms and sociotechnical transitions approaches. The first deep transition entails the long running emergence of industrial modernity since the late 18th century which culminated in the post-Second World War economic ‘golden age’ underpinned by rapid and stable growth and prosperity in North America and Western Europe. The Deep Transitions framework draws attention to the increasing role of fossil fuels over this long period, and how fossil fuel consumption accelerated in the 20th century taking on a particular direction where energy, mobility, and food systems became increasingly reliant on oil while the share of coal as a proportion of the energy mix decreased. This paper integrates sociotechnical, historical and geopolitical literatures to examine how the development of the age of oil was shaped by wartime demand pressures and logistical challenges and the search for new solutions to these challenges in the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.

Chemical terrorist attacks by non-state actors have traditionally been characterised as low probability events; however, the apparent normalisation of chemical weapons use, including by terrorists, in the ongoing conflict in Syria is causing some in the international security community to question whether it will remain low probability. For Europe there is an additional potential concern, namely the numbers of EU citizens who are "foreign fighters" and whose return from the conflict zone might also result in "importing" chemical weapons use. This article examines the rise of the "chemical weapons-returning foreign fighter" narrative and considers aspects of the European response. These responses predate the current concerns and include important efforts to create a robust public health response, such as early alert and communication systems, so that the attractiveness of these weapons being used within a European context might be reduced. Although there are limitations as to how far one can transfer what happens in a Syrian context to Europe, the suggestion is made that some of the framing assumptions within this response architecture may be now inadvertently limiting the potential to identify and respond to chemical attacks.

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This paper considers the biological weapons problem as a post-disarmament issue requiring 'management' or 'governance' rather than 'disarmament' or 'arms control'. This allows for a broader analysis of the BW problem, one where a range of relevant issues, threats, challenges and actors can be examined, as well as nation-states, international treaties, terrorist groups and the like. The paper therefore provides a more accurate depiction of the wide range of current efforts to minimise the chances of biology being misused for hostile purposes. It aims to explain how and why networks and non-state actors have emerged to play a bigger role in the governance of biological technologies.