Dual-process theories, cognitive decoupling and the outcome-to-intent shift: A developmental perspective on evolutionary ethicsAbstract/Introduction A central tenet of evolutionary ethics is that as a result of evolutionary processes, humans tend to respond in certain ways to particular moral problems. Various authors (particularly those associated with "dual-process" theories of reasoning) have posited conflicts between "fast", automatic, evolved impulses and more controlled judgements that may be more flexible and respond to culturally determined. In this chapter we argue that the evolutionary sources of automatic moral judgements are quite diverse, and include some intuitive processes (specifically, reading other people's intentions) that are quite sophisticated from a social-cognitive point of view. We further argue that processes of controlled, reflective moral reasoning represent the activity of higher-level process that arbitrate between conflicting inputs from diverse automatic heuristics, in response to normative concerns. The integration and subjugation of automatic responses to more reflective ones is a developmental process that develops at varying rates in different people and in different cultural contexts. To make this argument, we first consider how approaches that represent cognition in terms of two types of processesincluding but not limited to the automatic/reflective distinctioncan be rendered more sophisticated by a consideration of evolutionary developmental psychology.We then apply this more developmentally aware approach to an extended example of the phenomenon in children's moral development known as the outcome/intent shift. We finish by outlining a model that shows how automatic and controlled processes may be integrated in children's social learning in culturally variable ways. An Evolutionary-Developmental Perspective on Dual-Process Theories of CognitionMost evolutionarily inspired approaches to psychology, including moral psychology, view adult cognitive functioning as designed by evolution to solve adult adaptive problems.An example is the moral foundations theory of Haidt and colleagues (Graham et al., 2013), which sees moral cognition as responding to different kinds of triggers, each with relevance for differing aspects of fitness, including care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation (see Suhler & Churchland, 2011, for an extended critique). All these themes are couched in terms of the decisions that adult

Antecedentes: El crecimiento y diversificación de las relaciones entre humanos y otras especies animales ha suscitado el interés por la consideración o trato moral hacia dichas especies. Desde la cognición moral, se vienen estudiando tanto las tendencias de razonamiento, como la percepción de capacidades cognitivas que los humanos ven como importantes para considerar a un animal no humano digno de trato moral. Objetivos: El presente artículo realiza una reflexión respecto del denominado círculo moral como espacio psicológico, del cual se incluyen o excluyen agentes desde la percepción de capacidades y creencias asociadas a su estatus moral. Así, se exploran conceptos como el antropocentrismo o especismo, que han sido asociados a la naturaleza de las relaciones entre humanos y otras especies, para profundizar en el conocimiento que se tiene sobre los mismos en el desarrollo infantil. Resultados: La indagación realizada desde la cognición moral en el desarrollo lleva a conocer los antecedentes y cambios en la consideración moral de animales no humanos, además de permitir reflexionar en torno diversas formas de abordar y ampliar el estudio de la inclusión de animales en el círculo moral. Conclusión: Por ello, la parte final del artículo propone acudir a conceptos como la teleología y el desentendimiento moral para seguir profundizando en las bases cognitivas del trato moral a otras especies desde temprana edad, dadas las implicaciones en la educación y la situación ambiental actual.