No abstract

Can a musical work be created? Some say 'no'. But, we argue, there is no handbook of universally accepted metaphysical truths that they can use to justify their answer. Others say 'yes'. They have to find abstract objects that can plausibly be identified with musical works, show that abstract objects of this sort can be created, and show that such abstract objects can persist. But, we argue, none of the standard views about what a musical work is allows musical works both to be created and to persist. I. INTRODUCTION IN 'WHAT a Musical Work Is', Jerrold Levinson lays down three criteria that, he argues, any adequate account of what a musical work is must meet. 1 The first of these is what he calls the creatability requirement, namely: (Cre) Musical works must be such that they do not exist prior to the composer's compositional activity, but are brought into existence by that activity. 2 Levinson famously uses the three criteria to argue that a musical work is not a sound structure, but rather a sound-structure-as-indicated-by-composer-X-at

Theorists in the philosophy of art and philosophy of psychology are converging on the view that imagining is a distinct propositional attitude. When one imagines that P (while engaging with a fiction, daydreaming, contemplating, etc.), one tokens a representation that P, and this representation plays the functional role that is distinctive of imagining. In particular, this representation plays a role that is distinct from the role of belief, but that also triggers the kinds of strong feelings (emotions) that beliefs trigger. This chapter begins by surveying this trend to convergence and the evidence presented for it, and then turns to adding a further piece of evidence. The claim imagining that P can cause strong feelings is, at bottom, a causal claim amenable to neuroscientific investigation. But philosophers have not yet paid much attention to the available evidence from neuroscience. This chapter rectifies this omission, tracing the causal network between tokenings of representations that P, on the one hand, and strong feelings, on the other. It concludes that there is all but decisive evidence in favour of the view that imagining is a propositional attitude, distinct from belief, and capable of causing the strong feelings associated with its exercise.

No abstract

No abstract