Summary A complete mitochondrial (mt) genome sequence was reconstructed from a 38,000-year-old Neandertal individual using 8,341 mtDNA sequences identified among 4.8 Gb of DNA generated from ~0.3 grams of bone. Analysis of the assembled sequence unequivocally establishes that the Neandertal mtDNA falls outside the variation of extant human mtDNAs and allows an estimate of the divergence date between the two mtDNA lineages of 660,000±140,000 years. Of the 13 proteins encoded in the mtDNA, subunit 2 of cytochrome c oxidase of the mitochondrial electron transport chain has experienced the largest number of amino acid substitutions in human ancestors since the separation from Neandertals. There is evidence that purifying selection in the Neandertal mtDNA was reduced compared to other primate lineages suggesting that the effective population size of Neandertals was small.

It is well established that cells sense chemical signals from their local microenvironment and transduce them to the nucleus to regulate gene expression programmes. Although a number of experiments have shown that mechanical cues can also modulate gene expression, the underlying mechanisms are far from clear. Nevertheless, we are now beginning to understand how mechanical cues are transduced to the nucleus and how they influence nuclear mechanics, genome organization and transcription. In particular, recent progress in super-resolution imaging, in genome-wide application of RNA sequencing, chromatin immunoprecipitation and chromosome conformation capture and in theoretical modelling of 3D genome organization enables the exploration of the relationship between cell mechanics, 3D chromatin configurations and transcription, thereby shedding new light on how mechanical forces regulate gene expression.

Traditional statistical methods for confidentiality protection of statistical databases do not scale well to deal with GWAS databases especially in terms of guarantees regarding protection from linkage to external information. The more recent concept of differential privacy, introduced by the cryptographic community, is an approach which provides a rigorous definition of privacy with meaningful privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary external information, although the guarantees may come at a serious price in terms of data utility. Building on such notions, we propose new methods to release aggregate GWAS data without compromising an individual’s privacy. We present methods for releasing differentially private minor allele frequencies, chi-square statistics and p-values. We compare these approaches on simulated data and on a GWAS study of canine hair length involving 685 dogs. We also propose a privacy-preserving method for finding genome-wide associations based on a differentially-private approach to penalized logistic regression.

The protection of privacy of individual-level information in genome-wide association study (GWAS) databases has been a major concern of researchers following the publication of “an attack” on GWAS data by Homer et al. [1]. Traditional statistical methods for confidentiality and privacy protection of statistical databases do not scale well to deal with GWAS data, especially in terms of guarantees regarding protection from linkage to external information. The more recent concept of differential privacy, introduced by the cryptographic community, is an approach that provides a rigorous definition of privacy with meaningful privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary external information, although the guarantees may come at a serious price in terms of data utility. Building on such notions, Uhler et al. [2] proposed new methods to release aggregate GWAS data without compromising an individual's privacy. We extend the methods developed in [2] for releasing differentially-private χ2-statistics by allowing for arbitrary number of cases and controls, and for releasing differentially-private allelic test statistics. We also provide a new interpretation by assuming the controls’ data are known, which is a realistic assumption because some GWAS use publicly available data as controls. We assess the performance of the proposed methods through a risk-utility analysis on a real data set consisting of DNA samples collected by the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium and compare the methods with the differentially-private release mechanism proposed by Johnson and Shmatikov [3].