Evolutionary game theory is concerned with the evolutionarily stable outcomes of the process of natural selection. The theory is especially relevant when the fitness of an organism depends on the behaviour of other members of its population. Here we focus on the interaction between two organisms that have a conflict of interest. The standard approach to such two-player games is to assume that each player chooses a single action and that the evolutionarily stable action of each player is the best given the action of its opponent. We argue that, instead, most two-player games should be modelled as involving a series of interactions in which opponents negotiate the final outcome. Thus we should be concerned with evolutionarily stable negotiation rules rather than evolutionarily stable actions. The evolutionarily stable negotiation rule of each player is the best rule given the rule of its opponent. As we show, the action chosen as a result of the negotiation is not the best action given the action of the opponent. This conclusion necessitates a fundamental change in the way that evolutionary games are modelled.

SUMMARYWe address the question of how many males a female should mate with in the context of species in which males provide care for potential offspring. Our analysis is based on the evolutionarily stable levels of parental effort of a female and a group of males. In the case of one female and two males we give a complete analysis of how the female's preference for monogamy or polyandry depends on the fitness functions assumed in the model. We then go on to consider the question of how many males a female should mate with to receive the highest level of male care. Our results are relevant in particular to the mating system of the dunnock (Prunella modularis) and also to the general question of whether a species should be monogamous as opposed to polyandrous.

Evolutionary game theory is concerned with the evolutionarily stable outcomes of the process of natural selection. The theory is especially relevant when the fitness of an organism depends on the behaviour of other members of its population. Here we focus on the interaction between two organisms that have a conflict of interest. The standard approach to such two-player games is to assume that each player chooses a single action and that the evolutionarily stable action of each player is the best given the action of its opponent. We argue that, instead, most two-player games should be modelled as involving a series of interactions in which opponents negotiate the final outcome. Thus we should be concerned with evolutionarily stable negotiation rules rather than evolutionarily stable actions. The evolutionarily stable negotiation rule of each player is the best rule given the rule of its opponent. As we show, the action chosen as a result of the negotiation is not the best action given the action of the opponent. This conclusion necessitates a fundamental change in the way that evolutionary games are modelled.

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