Over the last fifteen years, hundreds of Muslim citizens claiming Armenian descent have submitted petitions to Turkey's secular legal authorities asking for changes to both their name and religion in the public record. In this article, I discuss the name-change cases of Armenian return converts to further the debates on Turkish secularism and to critique the body of scholarship that welcomes the governing Justice and Development Party's legal reforms as a measure of growing religious tolerance. In the article's first part I analyze the historical foundations of the regulation of religion and name changes in Turkey by fully and explicitly engaging with law as a site where minority difference is constructed, authorized, and challenged. The article's second half offers an alternative reading of how tolerance functions as an aspect of the Justice and Development Party's reforms. Based on my investigation of specific legal forms of argument that converted Armenians and their lawyers put forward in today's secular courts, and how legal officers of the state respond to them, I demonstrate that legal reform has shifted the definition of religion as a marker of minority difference in legal space. I argue that the historical context of name change and religious conversion forces the limits of existing understandings of freedom of religion in Turkey, and that this renders visible historical injustices that cannot be resolved simply through the notion of “religious tolerance” in the courts.

In June 2013, the Turkish government's plans for transforming a central park in Istanbul into a shopping mall started as merely another instance of the ongoing urbicide overseen by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP), but it produced an unexpected outcome. The courageous activism of a thousand members of small-size opposition groups eventually triggered the revolt of tens of thousands of people and the occupation of the park for weeks (D. Özgür 2013). 1 The toll of what became internationally known as the Gezi uprising included eight deaths and thousands of serious injuries resulting from the police's unbridled use of tear gas and plastic bullets. Amid the roar of chants reverberating day and night across the park during its occupation in June 2013, a key historical fact remained but a barely audible whisper: the occupied park once stood adjacent to an Armenian church with a cemetery spread Property, Dispossession, and

This paper examines grassroots mobilizations in Turkey against the government's policies on religion and education (RE), and the potential effects of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) on their mobilization. Specifically, it follows the ways in which grassroots actors frame their discourses of secularism and freedom of religion in education during a period when the Turkish government is aiming to increase the role of Sunni-Islam in national education, while at the same time refusing to implement ECtHR decisions regarding RE. Drawing on empirical research, it analyzes the role the ECtHR and its case law play in the diverse rights claims and discourses of three different types of mobilizations that is going on in the field of RE: (i) legal mobilization, and right to exemption and freedom from religion, (ii) political mobilization, and new discourses of pluralism and secularism, (iii) monitoring and policy-based mobilization and national and international advocacy for pluralism and equality in education.

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This chapter argues that the supposed binary of a secular state and popular Islam is inadequate as a tool of analysis if we are to understand how religion has become a prominent category of both privilege and exclusion in Turkish society. Specifically, it contends that successive Turkish governments have privileged Sunni Islam as national identity. To build this argument, the chapter follows two parallel threads. The first analyses the ethnic and religious homogenization of the national body with a particular emphasis on violence against non-Muslim and non-Sunni groups. The second shows how, within the larger historical context of modernization theory, Cold War politics, and the post-9/11 promotion of moderate Islam, successive Turkish governments worked towards maintaining Sunni Muslim privilege while continuously expanding the category of enemies of the Turkish nation.