This article asserts that the market for property insurance, particularly homeowners insurance, in the State of Florida is experiencing failures, and that a combination of market problems, externalities, and interventions unique to Florida led to these failures. The authors provide evidence of market failures in the form of undesirable market outcomes, both over time and in comparison to other coastal states. Also, they provide a narrative description of the market events, problems, and policies preceding these adverse market developments and link the narrative to the evidence. Recommendations for a return to risk‐based pricing and incentives for appropriate property mitigation are made.

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This study uses Miami-Dade County, Florida home sales, and Citizens Property Insurance Corporation data for the period 2004 through 2009 to measure the capitalization effect of increases in premiums on house prices. Using hedonic pricing models, spatial autocorrelation models, and difference-in-differences models, we find that new information was conveyed to homeowners in the higher risk areas by the 2004/2005 storms and that consumers appear to use the insurance premium as a "risk signal." We also find some support for the hypothesis that the risk of potential hurricane losses is communicated to potential homebuyers through windzone maps.

The fundamental shift in rating methodology from historical loss costs to catastrophe modeling for windstorm coverage calls into question the accuracy of rates developed using rating territories. Using premiums and modeled average annual loss (AAL) estimates from Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens) in Florida, this article analyzes the use of distance to coast (DtC) as a rating variable in providing coverage for the windstorm peril in homeowners insurance. Catastrophe models used to generate AAL costs do not rely on the same application of the law of large numbers as using historical loss costs and thus allows for more granular pricing of the windstorm peril. The results show that DtC, a rating variable that is property specific, more closely aligns premiums and AALs than territorial rating, and allows more granular pricing of the windstorm peril. More granular risk based pricing provides better incentives for homeowners regarding location and mitigation choices and may help reduce aggregate exposure to windstorm damages in the long run.

In this article, we examine the effect of laws prohibiting the hand‐held use of a cellphone while driving on the automobile insurance market. Our research is motivated by prior studies that present evidence that the enactment of such laws alters drivers’ behaviors in ways that reduce the risk of automobile accidents. We posit that that, by extension, these laws should also lead to reductions in the amount of losses paid by private passenger automobile physical damage insurers. Our analysis indicates that the enactment of a ban on the hand‐held use of a cellphone while driving reduces the incurred losses and incurred loss ratios of automobile insurers by approximately 3 percent, suggesting that these bans have important economic consequences not previously documented in the literature. Additional analysis suggests that hand‐held cellphone bans eventually lead to incremental reductions in premiums, but we do not observe these reductions in premiums until a couple of years following the enactment of a ban. Our analysis of automobile insurance losses also represents a departure from most prior studies of cellphone bans and therefore contributes to the ongoing debate in the public health literature regarding the extent to which hand‐held cellphone bans have implications for traffic safety.