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This study explores whether SFAS No. 151 affects firms' production-level decisions. Although the change from ARB No. 43 (FASB 1953) to SFAS No. 151 (FASB 2004) seems trivial at first glance, using a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from the Compustat database (SIC 2, 3) for the period 2003–2008, we document that abnormal production costs significantly increased after SFAS No. 151 became effective in 2005. The empirical evidence substantiates our hypothesis that the explicit expensing and reporting of idle facilities, as stipulated in SFAS No. 151, inadvertently further induces opportunism for excess production. Moreover, we find that firms that have limited options to indulge in accruals management, and those that have pressures to boost income, will have higher excess production after the adoption of SFAS No. 151. Supplementary analyses indicate that our results are robust with regard to controlling for sales manipulation, and to alternative explanations for excess production as well as alternative overproduction measures.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the transition from self-regulation to heteronomy has changed the gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors. Design/methodology/approach This study analyzes publicly held companies in the USA between 1999 and 2012 using univariate analysis, multivariate analysis and quantile regression analysis. Audit quality is measured with discretionary accruals. Findings This study shows an insignificant difference in audit quality between the clients of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors after Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) began its operations. In the analysis of the effects of PCAOB inspections on the audit quality of audit firms that are inspected annually and triennially, the findings show that the inspections have more positive effects when carried out annually. This suggests that the frequency of inspection is positively associated with audit quality. Overall, these results provide evidence that recent improvements in audit quality have been caused by changes in regulatory standards. Originality/value The paper provides three major original contributions. First, the authors add to the literature on audit quality by further demonstrating a reduced gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms due to heteronomy. Secondly, this study contributes to the debate as to whether independent inspections on audit firms are beneficial or not and suggests that the PCAOB inspections help increase audit quality. Finally, the results of this work contribute to the growing literature examining discretionary accruals.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of value-relevant accounting rules on corporate innovative activities. Using US data from 1972 to 2012, we find that valuerelevant accounting rules help innovative companies to reduce R&D funding gaps, which is conducive to companies' innovative activities and potential long-term benefits. However, a higher risk premium is required by shareholders of innovative companies. Additionally, we find not only that R&D spending is more sensitive to future earnings variability as compared to that occurring commercial intellectual properties and physical assets, but we also find that managers contracted with long-term compensation plans have greater incentives to engage in innovative activities when value-relevant accounting rules set in. Overall, we provide evidence on alleviation of information asymmetry between innovative companies and their lenders when accounting information is more value relevant.