In the current FIFA penalty shootout mechanism, a coin toss decides which team will kick first. Empirical evidence suggests that the team taking the first kick has a higher probability to win a shootout. We design sequentially fair shootout mechanisms such that in all symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria each of the skill-balanced teams has exactly 50% chance to win whenever the score is tied at any round. Consistent with empirical evidence, we show that the current mechanism is not sequentially fair and characterize all sequentially fair mechanisms. Taking additional desirable properties into consideration, we propose and uniquely characterize a practical mechanism.

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In most macroeconomic models in ‡ation tends to be harmful. In this paper we show that by simply changing the timing of production decisions by …rms from 'on demand'to 'in advance', some in ‡ation can boost welfare as long as goods are su¢ ciently perishable. The main conclusion from this research is that by e¤ectively hiding the strategic interaction between supply and demand, assuming production on demand is not without loss of generality.