Abstract-The widespread deployment of Automatic Metering Infrastructures in Smart Grid scenarios rises great concerns about privacy preservation of user-related data, from which detailed information about customer's habits and behaviors can be deduced. Therefore, the users' individual measurements should be aggregated before being provided to External Entities such as utilities, grid managers and third parties.This paper proposes a security architecture for distributed aggregation of additive data, in particular energy consumption metering data, relying on Gateways placed at the customers' premises, which collect the data generated by local Meters and provide communication and cryptographic capabilities. The Gateways communicate with one another and with the External Entities by means of a public data network. We propose a secure communication protocol aimed at preventing Gateways and External Entities from inferring information about individual data, in which privacy-preserving aggregation is performed by means of a cryptographic homomorphic scheme. The routing of information flows can be centralized or it can be performed in a distributed fashion using a protocol inspired by Chord. We compare the performance of both approaches to the optimal solution minimizing the data aggregation delay.

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Node compromise is a serious threat in wireless sensor networks. An adversary can use compromised sensor nodes to inject false data to deceive the base station or he can try to deplete the energy resources of the sensor nodes. One approach to mitigate the impact of node compromise exploits the redundancy property of many wireless sensor networks. If a node initiates a report generation for the base station, then this report must be endorsed by multiple neighboring sensor nodes. Already proposed schemes using this approach introduce a new possible attack, called False-EndorsementBased Denial of Service attack, where a compromised node sends a false endorsement which invalidates the collaboratively generated report. We propose an extension scheme, which enables the detection and exclusion of false endorsing nodes and is efficient in terms of storage and energy consumption.

We present our integration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC), more specifically of the post-quantum KEM scheme Kyber for key establishment and the post-quantum signature scheme SPHINCS + , into the embedded TLS library mbed TLS. We measure the performance of these post-quantum primitives on four different embedded platforms with three different ARM processors and an Xtensa LX6 processor. Furthermore, we compare the performance of our experimental PQC cipher suite to a classical TLS variant using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Post-quantum key establishment and signature schemes have been either integrated into TLS or ported to embedded devices before. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to combine TLS, post-quantum schemes, and embedded systems and to measure and evaluate the performance of post-quantum TLS on embedded platforms. Our results show that post-quantum key establishment with Kyber performs well in TLS on embedded devices compared to ECC variants. The use of SPHINCS + signatures comes with certain challenges in terms of signature size and signing time, which mainly affects the use of embedded systems as PQC-TLS server but does not necessarily prevent embedded systems to act as PQC-TLS clients. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Digital signatures; • Networks → Transport protocols; Security protocols; • Theory of computation → Cryptographic primitives; Cryptographic protocols.