Detecting Node Compromise in Hybrid Wireless Sensor Networks Using Attestation Techniques

Krauß, Christoph; Stumpf, Frederic; Eckert, Claudia

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-73275-4_15

Cited by 47 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In a cluster-based WSN, each cluster head can be equipped with a TPM for the purpose of remote attestation. However, the TPM-based scheme 10 incurs a considerable storage overhead to the cluster heads because several hash values must be reserved.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

SARA: Sandwiched attestation through remote agents for cluster-based wireless sensor networks

Yang

Yen

2017

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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Cluster-based wireless sensor networks have advantages of scalability and efficient communication. However, a major security risk to cluster heads is a malicious code injection attack through which an adversary can completely control a cluster network to deliver fake data and obtain private data. Memory attestation scheme is an effective mechanism for attesting the firmware integrity of an embedded device. Unfortunately, existing hardware-based remote attestation scheme relying on a trusted platform module incurs a considerable storage overhead to cluster heads. Therefore, this article proposes a lightweight hardware-based remote attestation scheme that comprises two remote attestation protocols. A lightweight hardware security module without executing any complicated cryptographic computation is employed and can substantially reduce the development cost and energy consumption compared with the trusted platform module. In the proposed scheme, a base station can attest each individual cluster head while all cluster nodes can simultaneously attest their cluster head in regular intervals. Performance analysis indicates that the storage requirement for cluster heads is independent of the number of attestation sessions. Furthermore, the computational cost of cluster nodes for the proposed scheme is comparable to that of the trusted platform module-based scheme. The proposed scheme is particularly suitable for long-term applications based on lightweight cluster heads.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

SARA: Sandwiched attestation through remote agents for cluster-based wireless sensor networks

Yang

Yen

2017

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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“…Integrity of nodes may for example be verified by an attestation protocol, which uses a trusted platform module (TPM) to attest the integrity of cluster heads [1]. But in order to enable a WSN-operator to react to tampering attempts, information about node integrity needs to be exchanged throughout the network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Concealed Integrity Monitoring for Wireless Sensor Networks

Stelte¹,

Bühring

2011

WSN

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Nowadays, sensor networks are widely installed around the world. Typical sensors provide data for healthcare, energy management, environmental monitoring, etc. In the future sensors will become a part of critical infrastructures. In such a scenario the network operator has to monitor the integrity of the network devices, otherwise the trustworthiness of the whole system is questionable. The problem is that every integrity protocol needs a secure channel between the devices. Therefore, we will introduce a covert channel for hidden transportation of integrity monitoring messages. The covert channel enables us to hide integrity check messages embedded into regular traffic without giving potential attackers a hint on the used integrity protocol.

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“…Detecting and defending against attacks are important tasks of security mechanisms. To review easily, we summarize current related research works [11,[15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24] as attack detecting mechanisms, and node compromise detecting mechanisms.…”

Section: Attack Detectingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some hardware-based approaches such as [23] are based on public-key cryptography and require extensive computational power, as well as the transmission of large messages, making these approaches not usable in WSNs. Krauss et al [24] supposed that some cluster nodes possed much more resources than the majority of clusters and were equipped with a All of above mechanisms can be adapted to check whether the given node has been compromised under their assumptions, though sometimes their assumptions are very strong. For example, [22] assumed that the attacker's hardware devices were not present in the sensor network for the duration of the repair process.…”

Section: Node Compromise Detecting Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…So the base station must have some mechanisms to invoke these codes. To express easily, we denote current approaches [21][22][23][24] as checking mechanisms and those mechanisms that invoke these checking mechanisms as starting mechanisms. The algorithm of the starting mechanisms is very important because if the executing interval for each node is small, they introduce a lot of communication cost and consume large computing resources; on the contrary, if the executing interval for each node is large, the compromised nodes may have long time to paralyze the network.…”

Section: Node Compromise Detecting Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Defense Against Node Compromise in Sensor Network Security

Chen¹

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Detecting Node Compromise in Hybrid Wireless Sensor Networks Using Attestation Techniques

Cited by 47 publications

References 6 publications

SARA: Sandwiched attestation through remote agents for cluster-based wireless sensor networks

SARA: Sandwiched attestation through remote agents for cluster-based wireless sensor networks

Concealed Integrity Monitoring for Wireless Sensor Networks

Defense Against Node Compromise in Sensor Network Security

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