We employ an event study methodology to investigate the stock price reaction around the day of the political decision to include a country-by-country reporting obligation for EU financial institutions. We do not find significant abnormal returns for the banks affected. Sample splits according to the effective tax rate and the degree of B2C orientation do not reveal a more pronounced negative investor response for banks engaging more strongly in tax avoidance or being potentially more concerned about reputational risks, respectively. We conclude that the implementation of a CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions did not trigger a noticeable investor response. Contrary prior findings regarding other public tax disclosure obligations might be driven by the distinct motivation of the rules and the way the information is presented. We contend that capital market reactions to an upcoming increase in tax transparency are not generalizable to other industries and settings, but that consideration must be given to the context and the exact design of the rule.

Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Abstract:We employ an event study methodology to investigate the stock price reaction around the day of the political decision to include a country-by-country reporting obligation for EU financial institutions. We do not find significant abnormal returns for the banks affected. Sample splits according to the effective tax rate and the degree of B2C orientation do not reveal a more pronounced negative investor response for banks engaging more strongly in tax avoidance or being potentially more concerned about reputational risks, respectively. We conclude that the implementation of a CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions did not trigger a noticeable investor response. Contrary prior findings regarding other public tax disclosure obligations might be driven by the distinct motivation of the rules and the way the information is presented. We contend that capital market reactions to an upcoming increase in tax transparency are not generalizable to other industries and settings, but that consideration must be given to the context and the exact design of the rule.JEL Classification: H25, H26, G21, G28

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