Platform companies disrupt not only the economic sectors they enter, but also the regulatory regimes that govern those sectors. We examine Uber in the United States as a case of regulating this disruption in different arenas: cities, state legislatures, and judicial venues. We find that the politics of Uber regulation does not conform to existing models of regulation. We describe instead a pattern of “disruptive regulation”, characterized by a challenger-incumbent cleavage, in two steps. First, an existing regulatory regime is not deregulated but successfully disregarded by a new entrant. Second, the politics of subsequently regulating the challenger leads to a dual regulatory regime. In the case of Uber, disruptive regulation takes the form of challenger capture, an elite-driven pattern, in which the challenger has largely prevailed. It is further characterized by the surrogate representation of dispersed actors—customers and drivers—who do not have autonomous power and who rely instead on shifting alignments with the challenger and incumbent. In its surrogate capacity in city and state regulation, Uber has frequently mobilized large numbers of customers and drivers to lobby for policy outcomes that allow it to continue to provide service on terms it finds acceptable. Because drivers have reaped less advantage from these alignments, labor issues have been taken up in judicial venues, again primarily by surrogates (usually plaintiffs’ attorneys) but to date have not been successful.

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Why do some indigenous groups achieve coethnic political representation while others do not? In this paper, I highlight the primary role of communal property in shaping indigenous representation. While scholars often laud the developmental benefits of communal land titling, I argue that formalizing collectively held land can inhibit indigenous coordination to achieve political representation. Where communal land is informally held, indigenous groups are more likely to invest in traditional institutions that facilitate collective action to elect coethnic candidates to political office. Conversely, titling communal property secures indigenous land access but in the process erodes traditional institutions that would otherwise promote collective action during elections. I test my argument using a multi-method approach that includes interviews and experiments with three-hundred Peruvian indigenous leaders, historical land-title data, and information scraped from mayoral candidate CVs. The findings suggest that the oft-cited economic benefits of collective property may generate negative political effects.

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Weakly institutionalized party systems are a defining feature of third-wave democracies. Yet, in some countries like Peru, party weakness is not a static equilibrium but rather part of a dynamic process of “party system erosion” in which weak parties become weaker over time as independents come to dominate subnational posts. As I argue, party system erosion is driven by a particular configuration of institutional factors—weak party brands, ease of ballot access, and limited partisan control over resource distribution. These institutional features increase the likelihood that experienced candidates will run as independents. When these candidates are elected, they obtain more intergovernmental discretionary transfers, which are used to improve performance and maintain clientelistic networks. This resource advantage of independent officials further weakens party brands and reduces experienced candidates’ incentives to run with parties in future elections. I test this theory using a data set of 80,000 subnational officials and a regression discontinuity design.