No abstract

No abstract

This article seeks to explain the differing counter-terrorist effects in Algeria and Yemen over the past two decades. While terrorism peaked in both countries in the late 1990s and incumbents in both countries responded with "carrot and stick" strategies, the results have been entirely different, with Yemen mired in deeper violence, whereas domestic terrorist forces were almost wiped out in Algeria in the late 2000s. To account for this variance and to measure the effects of the "carrot and stick" approach, the article adopts the state capacity model by analyzing how Bouteflika centralized Algeria's bureaucracy and administration since 1999 which facilitated the communication between the intelligence, military and judiciary, thus strengthening military operations and law enforcement, and how Saleh's Yemen filled with separatism and sectarianism aggravated the regime's deficiencies of information collection and revenue concentration, leading to the continuation of terrorism. Evidence from my framework and cases suggest that coping with terrorist violence requires much more thoroughgoing measures than military blows; legislative efforts and national dialogues.

Abtstract A recurrent question is whether Islamist parties surreptitiously capitalize on political change to weaken or establish their own authoritarianism. In this article, we contend that the answer to this question depends largely on how ruling elites in authoritarian systems structure and manage the Islamist marketplace, thus affecting the position of Islam in politics and society. In our comparative analysis of Tunisia and Algeria, we distinguish between a state‐dominated Islamist marketplace and a managed, open, pluralist Islamist marketplace. We postulate that Islamist parties in monopolized Islamist marketplaces are more likely to gain ground when they challenge authoritarianism. Thus, the marginalization/repression of Islamist political parties cannot, nor should it, seek to eliminate Islamist sentiments, while the opening of an Islamist pluralist marketplace is less likely to produce a hegemonic Islamist political party. The analysis of the trajectories of the Islamist movements informs on the management of Islamism and provides lessons for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and, conceivably, Islamic States elsewhere. Therefore, both policy makers and academics should renounce “de‐Islamizing” an Islamic society and focus instead on judicious approaches to managing Islamism in Muslim‐dominated societies and integrating Islamist parties into a democratic polity.