This article presents a critical review of the statist perspective on East Asian political economy. The statist perspective is found lacking in its claims to explain economic performance, neglectful of intra-state dynamics, and inadequate in its depictions of state-society relations. Studies attempting to remedy these shortcomings through an application of concepts from network theory are also examined. These studies provide a conceptually richer description of state-society interaction. However, they fall short of explaining the essentially political nature of interaction, both between state and society and within the state. New directions for research are suggested.The key elements of the alternative approach are politics, institutions and leadership choice. These factors are widely acknowledged to be mutually influencing; however, the nature of their interrelations is only vaguely understood. A crucial task of research lies in explaining how politics, institutions and leadership choices interact to constitute lines of policy and to shape trajectories of economic development.East Asia's remarkable economic success over the past three decades has bred a powerful new paradigm in the field of development economics and comparative political economy, centering around the concept of the developmental state (Onis 1991).' The paradigm attributes impressive economic performance by Japan and the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries, especially South Korea and Taiwan, to the choice of efficient, coherent, and flexible economic policies and their effective implementation. Central to the developmental state paradigm are a state structure characterized by executive dominance, bureaucratic unity, and the technical competence of bureaucrats; a large pool of policy instruments, selective and strategic use of resources and instruments; and the political capacity to insulate economic decision-making and implementation from contending political and social interests (Johnson 1982;

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Two basic positions have framed recent debates about South Korea's remarkable economic growth. The neoclassical position traces South Korea's take-off to a set of policy reforms in 1964 and 1965 that launched the country on the path toward export-led growth (Frank, Kim, and Westphal 1975; Kuznets 1977; Krueger 1979). Policy was far from laissez-faire, but on the whole, the reforms moved Korea in a more market-oriented direction that sought to exploit Korea's comparative advantage. The “statists,” by contrast, detail the pervasive intervention of the Korean government in the economy, even after the shift toward an outward-oriented strategy. Moreover, they argue that such intervention promoted rapid economic growth (Leudde-Neurath 1985; Jones and Sakong 1980; Amsden 1989).

Recent writing on the rapid growth of the East Asian newly industrializing countries—Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—has been dominated by an institutionalist perspective that focuses on the “strength” of the state vis-à-vis societal actors. A study of Korea's stabilization efforts in the 1980s underlines the importance of organizational factors in explaining policy outcomes, but also suggests important limits on institutionalist arguments. These include the absence of unique institutional solutions for political problems and the indeterminacy of institutional configuration with respect to the economic efficiency of policy. A focus on characteristics of the state alone can overlook the organizational resources of societal actors and the interest of politicians in building bases of support even in “strong” states.

South Korea's civilian control over the military has been amazingly stable, and no signs of political moves by the military have ever been detected since 1993. Given the frequency of military's intervention in civil politics and a relatively long duration of military rule, such civil-military relations seem quite anomalous. The article argues that the persistent civilian control over the military was an outcome of path-dependency of the military rule that disfavours military intervention in civil politics, while strengthening civilian control over the military. In South Korea, the military did not intervene in civilian politics as an institution. Two military interventions (1961 and 1979) were nothing but greedy acts of politically motivated military officers, and those who seized political power crafted institutional arrangements that could prevent another military intervention. Consequently, the military in South Korea was highly de-politicized, and path dependency has produced a structure rather favourable to civilian control over the military in the postdemocratic transition period. Sanctioning and monitoring deserve special attention in this regard. Finally, socio-economic development and overall democratic maturity have led to the popular rejection of the military as a political actor, fostering the norm of traditional professionalism within the military.