As one of the most important components within a vehicle, diesel engines have high requirements for reliability due to the harsh operating environments. However, previous studies have mainly focused on the reliability assessment of diesel engines, while less research has been conducted on the modeling of the diesel engine reliability analysis and its management. For this reason, this paper proposes a comprehensive method for reliability analysis and its management based on the use of 4F integration technology in the early stages of diesel engine design. First of all, an expert group used FEMCA (failure mode, effects and criticality analysis) and FHA (functional hazard analysis) to find the most harmful level of fault mode. At the same time, a new method for the repair of dynamic fault trees to find the weak links at the component level was developed. Finally, a FRACAS (fracture report analysis and corrective action system) was used during the above analysis process. By applying this method to the reliability assessment of a diesel engine in the design stage, the problems of failure information feedback and the reuse of failure information in the actual reliability assessment can be solved.

Inspired by Shalev’s model of loss aversion, we investigate the effect of loss aversion on a bimatrix game where the payoffs in the bimatrix game are characterized by triangular fuzzy variables. First, we define three solution concepts of credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria, and their existence theorems are presented. Then, three sufficient and necessary conditions are given to find the credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria. Moreover, the relationship among the three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria is discussed in detail. Finally, for 2×2 bimatix game with triangular fuzzy payoffs, we investigate the effect of loss aversion coefficients and confidence levels on the three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria. It is found that an increase of loss aversion levels of a player leads to a decrease of his/her own payoff. We also find that the equilibrium utilities of players are decreasing (increasing) as their own confidence levels when players employ the optimistic (pessimistic) value criterion.

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