No abstract

This paper offers a critical look at the promises and drawbacks of a popular, novel data collection technique—online tracking—from the point of view of sample composition. Using data from two large-scale studies about political attitudes and information consumption behavior carried out in Germany and Switzerland, we find that the likelihood of participation in a tracking study at several critical dropout points is systematically related to the gender, age, and education of participants, with men, young, and more educated participants being less likely to dropout of the studies. Our findings also show that these patterns are incremental, as changes in sample composition accumulate over successive study stages. Political interest and ideology were also significantly related to the likelihood of participation in tracking research. The study explores some of the most common concerns associated with tracking research leading to non-participation, finding that they also differ across demographic groups. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Despite the alleged affinity between populism and conspiracy theories, how they relate on the individual level remains relatively unknown. This study explores the relation between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs at the individual level. First, I test whether the conspiracist facets, which directly involve governmental participation, are associated with the dimensions of populist attitudes. Further, I examine the relation of political trust with the dimensions and facets of both constructs as well as their predictive power of the self-reported propensity to vote for a populist party. To test these assumptions, a cross-sectional study was conducted in Germany. Confirmatory factor analyses indicate a strong association between conspiracist facets that directly involve governmental participation and the anti-elitism and sovereignty dimensions of populist attitudes. Findings further show that low political trust is related to all dimensions of populist attitudes–especially anti-elitism–and to the conspiracist facets. Furthermore, the sovereignty dimension of populist attitudes and low political trust predict the propensity to vote for the right-wing populist party AfD. These findings provide new insights to a more nuanced understanding of populism on the individual level and the relation to conspiracy beliefs.

Based on the assumption that disclosing explicit populist radical-right (PRR) attitudes and voting intentions for PRR parties may be inhibited by a social desirability bias, this paper aims at developing a measure for implicit populist attitudes (IAT) and at assessing its explanatory power for the prediction of PRR party support. Using data from a German online survey (N = 898), the populism-IAT is tested against corresponding direct measures of populist attitudes and anti-immigrant attitudes to predict voting propensity for the German PRR party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Results reveal that social desirability concerns indeed restrict the likelihood of reporting a high propensity of PRR vote; however, direct measures turn out as best predictors for self-reported voting intentions. Inconsistencies between implicit and explicit attitudes may indicate sensitivity to social (un-)desirability perceptions, when attitudes are displayed on the implicit but not on the explicit level. We find such incongruencies for 9% of our respondents regarding populist attitudes, and for 21% regarding anti-immigrant attitudes, indicating that the latter are considered even more undesirable. In light of our findings, we discuss the potential explanatory power of implicit attitudes for less deliberate forms of political behavior and the assumption of populist and anti-immigrant attitudes still being regarded as socially undesirable in Germany.

We conceptualize and measure right‐wing populism (RWP) as a three‐dimensional concept, explicitly and implicitly, based on online surveys and implicit association tests (IATs) in Germany and Switzerland. Confirmatory factor analyses show that explicit populism, nativism, and authoritarianism establish the latent RWP‐construct and that they are each related to their respective implicit counterpart. However, RWP ideology does not exist as an equally robust construct in the implicit realm as it does in the explicit realm. Resulting implicit‐explicit incongruence is psychologically meaningful in that it is moderated by willingness to comply with perceived social norms: For participants who perceive that their own political views differ from their social environment and who conceal their diverging opinions, implicit attitudes differ more strongly from explicit attitudes. This supports our rationale that explicit expression of RWP‐ideology is subject to social‐compatibility concerns. Hence, corresponding implicit attitudes are useful to fully assess the RWP potential within society.