No abstract

An implicit understanding of false belief indicated by anticipatory looking has been shown to be significantly correlated with performance on explicit false-belief tasks in 3- and 4-year-old children (Low, 2010). Recent evidence from infant research indicates, however, that implicit false-belief understanding guides infants' expectations about goal-directed actions even in the second year of life. The present study presents data from a sample of N= 70 infants who were tested longitudinally at 15, 18, 30, 36 and 48 months with implicit and explicit Theory of Mind measures, as well as an assessment of verbal IQ. Belief-based anticipatory looking in the false-belief task at 18 months significantly predicted verbal false-belief reasoning at 48 months, after controlling for verbal IQ. These findings indicate developmental continuity and conceptual specificity in belief reasoning from infancy to preschool age. They are discussed with respect to competing accounts of infants' understanding of the mind.

Twelve- and 14-month-old infants' ability to represent another person's visual perspective (Level-1 visual perspective taking) was studied in a looking-time paradigm. Fourteen-month-olds looked longer at a person reaching for and grasping a new object when the old goal-object was visible than when it was invisible to the person (but visible to the infant). These findings are consistent with the interpretation that infants 'rationalized' the person's reach for a new object when the old goal-object was out of sight. Twelve-month-olds did not distinguish between test conditions. The present findings are consistent with recent research on infants' developing understanding of seeing.

Preschool children’s basic scientific reasoning abilities were investigated in two experiments. Consistent with findings by Ruffman et al. (1993) , Experiment 1 showed that even 4-year-olds can evaluate patterns of covariation evidence. However, even 6-year-olds had difficulties interpreting non-covariation evidence. Experiment 2 showed that 5-year-olds could overcome this difficulty when prompted to expect no causal relationship between two variables. Experiment 2 further showed that preschoolers’ evidence evaluation skills were affected by their pre-existing causal beliefs. However, their performance was above chance even when the evidence contradicted a prior belief they held with some conviction. In sum, our results demonstrate a basic understanding of the hypothesis-evidence relationship in preschool children, thus contributing to a revision of the picture of the scientifically illiterate preschooler.

This study examined longitudinal relations between early measures of prosocial action in infancy as well as cognitive and social-cognitive abilities, and the sharing behaviour of preschool children. The results reveal relations between delay-of-gratification at 24 months and inhibitory control at 30 months, and children's sharing at 5 years. Moreover, the analyses showed specific relations between distress understanding at 24 months and preschool children's sharing with friends, and a relation between goal encoding at 7 months and sharing with a disliked other at 5 years. Yet, there were no relations between early measures of prosociality in infancy and preschool children's sharing. The results support the view that inhibitory control competencies and social-cognitive abilities play an important role in the early development of prosocial action.