No abstract

The global use of online communities has exploded to involve hundreds of millions of users. Despite the tremendous social impact and business opportunities afforded by these communities, little information systems (IS) research has addressed them -especially in a cross-cultural context. Our research proposes an online community self-disclosure model, tested in a crosscultural setting using data provided by French and British working professionals. Our model is based on social exchange theory (SET) and social penetration theory (SPT), as well as on cross-cultural theory related to individualism-collectivism. SET explains that individuals engage in relationships when the perceived costs associated with the relationship are less than the expected benefits. SPT extends SET to explain that individuals participate in self-disclosure to foster relationships -reciprocation is the primary benefit of self-disclosure, whereas risk is the foundational cost of self-disclosure. Our study established several important findings: positive social influence to use an online community increases online community self-disclosure; reciprocity increases self-disclosure; online community trust increases self-disclosure; and privacy risk beliefs decrease self-disclosure. Meanwhile, a tendency toward collectivism increases self-disclosure. We further found that French participants had higher scores on horizontal individualism than British participants. Several other findings and their implications for practice are also discussed.

Phase I. Discovering the new construct's domain space (i.e., the relevant associated behaviors within the environment encompassed by the proposed construct) (determine the key behaviors that best represent a construct, from the perspective of the theory-based literature, experts, and target participants for whom the construct is being defined) Step 1a. Behavioral elicitation through literature review

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Research shows that organisational efforts to protect their information assets from employee security threats do not always reach their full potential and may actually encourage the behaviours they attempt to thwart, such as reactive computer abuse (CA). To better understand this dilemma, we use fairness theory (FT) and reactance theory (RT) to explain why employees may blame organisations for and retaliate against enhanced information security policies (ISPs). We tested our model with 553 working professionals and found support for most of it. Our results show that organisational trust can decrease reactive CA. FT suggests that explanation adequacy (EA) is an important factor that builds trust after an event. Our results also suggest that trust both fully mediates the relationship between EA and CA and partially mediates the relationship between perceived freedom restrictions related to enhanced ISPs and reactive CA. EA also had a strong negative relationship with freedom restrictions. Moreover, organisational security education, training and awareness (SETA) initiatives decreased the perceptions of external control and freedom restrictions and increased EA, and advance notification of changes increased EA. We also included 14 control variables and rival explanations to determine with more confidence what drove reactive CA in our context. Notably, the deterrence theory (DT)‐based constructs of sanction severity, certainty and celerity had no significant influence on reactive CA. We provide support for the importance of respectful communication efforts and SETA programmes, coupled with maximising employee rights and promoting trust and fairness to decrease reactive CA. These efforts can protect organisations from falling victim to their own organisational security efforts.