Central to the still-nascent normative literature on counterspeech is the widespread belief that citizens should engage discursively with haters and the effects of hate speech. It is also increasingly clear that discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be understood as a continuous and extended series of different and connected actions. Much less has been said about the ways that attempts in persuasion and direct responses to hate speech relate to one another and about when specific counterspeech actions should happen. This essay advances a more expansive and refined account of counterspeech, which is understood as a combination of continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society and acts of distancing from haters (shaming, correcting falsehoods, “Not in my name” campaigns, protests, and forms of discursive exit). After reconsidering discursive agency distribution (that is, who is an active participant, how, and when) around public hate speech, I show that continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be interrupted by visible acts of distancing when haters make hateful representative claims.

In recent years, there has been an explosion of categories and labels to account for the expansion of forms of cooperation beyond the membership of the Development Assistance Committee. Such hype has led to the construction of the so-called southern model as the archetype of development cooperation coming from non-Development Assistance Committee countries that are somehow committed to the principles of the South-South cooperation. The present article challenges the idea of a southern model by providing an analysis of drivers, tools, and modality of development assistance.

This article sheds light upon the role of the audience in the construction and amendment of populist representative claims that in themselves strengthen representative-represented relationships and simultaneously strengthen ties between the represented who belong to different constituencies. I argue that changes in populist representative claims can be explained by studying the discursive relationship between a populist representative and the audience as a conversation in which both poles give and receive something. From this perspective, populist representative claims, I also argue, can be understood as acts of bonding with the intended effect of constituting ‘the people,’ and inputs from the audience can be seen as conversational exercitives. Populist appeals therefore may change when the audience enacts new permissibility facts and signals to populist representatives that there is another way to strengthen relationships between several individuals belonging to otherwise-different constituencies.

While most of the literature has attempted to justify harsh and soft containment given some fundamental commitments of political liberalism, I focus on how justified forms of containment can in themselves be deemed effective. This article shows that a reading of Rawls allows for a comparison of different containment practices based on their capacity to protect the stability of liberal democracies under serious threat. And, in making it possible to compare harsh and soft containment, I evaluate immediate stability gains against citizens’ judgements about their liberal democratic institutions.

In this article, I argue that the experimentalist model of democracy can contribute to contemporary disputes about deliberation at the supranational level. The fundamental idea is that, in conditions of disagreement, for a decision to be legitimate, deliberative decision-making processes must be structured so as to allow the inclusion of affected interests before and after voting. I argue that there are three ways for a decision to be illegitimate: exclusion of affected interests from all deliberative phases, Captain Hook politics and garbage-time politics. Captain Hook politics and garbage-time politics illuminate an important variable: in a deliberative process, some interests may enter deliberation too early, other interests too late. However, for a decision to be legitimate, it is not only important that all affected interests can have an influence on collectively binding decisions, but it is also important what moment in time such interests play a part in the deliberative process.