This is the introduction to a special collection of contributions that analyse key features of the European Union's (EU) trade policy in the twenty-first century, notably its politicization. As such, it examines the degree to which EU trade policy and its environment have changed over the last 20 years. More specifically, it begins with a brief review of the main changes to the structure of international trade and the resulting impacts on trade agreements. Second, it describes the institutional changes (notably the Lisbon Treaty) that have affected the EU's trade policy-making. Third, it discusses how the abovementioned changes have affected the EU's trade policy. Finally, it summarizes the special collection's key contributions to our improved understanding of EU trade policy in the twenty-first century as well as pinpoints new issues that scholars of EU trade policy should pay close attention to in their future research agendas.

Using detailed census data covering over 30,000 farms in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, Canada, we document the vast and increasing farm size heterogeneity, and analyse the role of farm size in adapting to the removal of an export subsidy in 1995. Consistent with the Alchian-Allen hypothesis, the increase in per-unit trade costs due to the reform was associated with farms of all sizes shifting their production of crops from low value wheat to higher value canola. We find that switching to new labour-saving tillage technologies and away from summerfallow in response to the large negative shock to grain prices caused by the reform varied across the farm size distribution. We develop a theory of heterogenous farms and technology adoption that can explain our findings.

The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union (EU) has been hailed as the trend-setter for third-generation trade agreements, which focus predominantly on beyond-the-border impediments to international trade (e.g., rules and regulations) than at-the-border barriers (e.g., tariffs). CETA formed the basis for subsequent EU trade agreements, which are a key element of the EU’s trade policy. It also provided inspiration for third-generation trade agreements outside the EU. The big question for trade policy, in the EU and beyond, is whether third-generation trade agreements achieve their intended objectives with respect to beyond-the-border obstacles to trade. In other words, are they effective instruments in liberalizing international trade? After all, facilitating trade through regulatory and administrative cooperation is much more difficult than eliminating or lowering tariffs on imported goods. Having been in force (provisionally) for five years, CETA offers the best case to study the effectiveness of third-generation trade agreements.

Medical and health care services represent large proportions of Gross National Product (GDP) in most countries yet remain protected and, hence, little traded. This suggests that large gains from trade are likely to exist from opening medical and health care services to international competition. The pent up demand for cross border services is underlined by the growth in medical tourism – a very inefficient method of organizing international trade – and the rapid expansion of international transfers of medical data, analysis and professional skills as electronic communications technology and co-requisite programing advance. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has had little success in garnering commitments in these areas of services. The article examines the GATS to determine the reasons for its lack of success. The GATS suffers from institutional rigidities and difficulties in identifying opportunities for reciprocity. These constraints combined with the typically strong protectionist lobbying has meant opportunities for gains from trade remain largely unexploited. GATS, health care services, medical tourism, modes, protectionism, reciprocity, remote delivery, trade, vested interests, WTO

Trade in genetically modified (GM) products remains a major issue in international trade. In 1999, the EU imposed a temporary import ban on genetically modified organisms. In the wake of aWorld Trade Organization (WTO) case brought by the US and Canada against the import ban - which the EU lost - the EU put in place a new regulatory regime for GM products. As of March 2012, the operation of this new import regime has not been formally assessed. The first GM-crops are just now working their way through the post-moratorium regulatory system and an assessment of the operation of the regime is timely. The results of this assessment suggest that the EU's approval system is only partially based in science and thus, the potential for political interference remains. Hence, the new EU regulatory regime for GM products makes investments in trade related activities pertaining to GM products very risky.