Public health authorities should involve the clinical and laboratory community and engage the local community in vector control and case reporting.

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Center convened a meeting of senior government officials, hospital leaders, clinicians, and public health officials on Hospital Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza in Baltimore, Maryland. A list of meeting participants is provided in Appendix 1. Individual comments were not for attribution so as to foster a frank and open discussion.The purpose of the meeting was to examine ways the U.S. healthcare community, and especially hospitals, can prepare to care for the large number of patients that would be expected during an influenza pandemic. At the meeting, the group was asked to discuss the serious challenges hospitals and communities will confront, to try to reach accord on what high-level solutions should be pursued, and to examine actions and next steps that the group or others might take to bring about such changes.To structure the meeting conversation, the staff of the Center for Biosecurity presented its initial assessment of the issues. The assessment was informed by analyzing pre-meeting discussions with the group and other government and clinical leaders and by reviewing information from a broad range of government and industry reports and peer-reviewed literature. This meeting report synopsizes the presentations given at the meeting and the group's discussions.Initially, a vision of success in hospital preparedness was proposed: U.S. hospitals, individually and jointly, will be able to provide medical care for flu victims while maintaining other essential medical services in the community during and after a pandemic.

Conditions that facilitate sustained dengue transmission exist in the United States, and outbreaks have occurred during the past decade in Texas, Hawaii, and Florida. More outbreaks can also be expected in years to come. To combat dengue, medical and public health practitioners in areas with mosquito vectors that are competent to transmit the virus must be aware of the threat of reemergent dengue, and the need for early reporting and control to reduce the impact of dengue outbreaks. Comprehensive dengue control includes human and vector surveillance, vector management programs, and community engagement efforts. Public health, medical, and vector-control communities must collaborate to prevent and control disease spread. Policy makers should understand the role of mosquito abatement and community engagement in the prevention and control of the disease.

This article describes and analyzes key aspects of the medical response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. It is based on interviews with individuals involved in the response and on analysis of published reports and news articles. Findings include: (1) federal, state, and local disaster plans did not include provisions for keeping hospitals functioning during a large-scale emergency; (2) the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) was ill-prepared for providing medical care to patients who needed it; (3) there was no coordinated system for recruiting, deploying, and managing volunteers; and (4) many Gulf Coast residents were separated from their medical records. The article makes recommendations for improvement.