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Support was found for a hierarchical model of argumentativeness theory (N = 1541) in which the second-order factors of motivation to argue and verbal aggressiveness exert top-down influence on subsidiary motives and attitudes. Emotional involvement with arguing and emotional involvement with verbal aggressing were added to clarify the originating theory and to improve model fit. The argumentativeness scale was heterogeneous, consisting of distinct ability and motivation to argue factors. Ability to argue had a direct negative effect and an indirect positive effect on verbal aggressiveness, with this positive effect mediated by motivation to argue. The positive effect of motivation to argue on verbal aggressiveness was moderated by college education, suggesting that students acquire a debate schema during their first semesters of college that enables them to better control their arguments, preventing escalation into verbal aggression. The methodological and theoretical implications of the results are discussed.

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This study is aimed a t understanding how people edit their own arguments prior to uttering them (Hample, 1984; Hample & Dallinger, 19854 1985b). 7he main categories of editorial criteria are effectiueness, principled objection to type of argument, person-centered issues, and discourse competence standards. Our main purpose here is to begn an account of what sort of person prefers which criteria. Argumentativeness (InfantelkRancer, 1982), verbalaggression (Infante & Wigley, I W), interpersonalorientation (Swap&Rubin, I W), and respondent gender are associated with use of editorial criteria. Results point to hO0 different approaches to editing one's own arguments. The task orientation focuses on effectiveness, and is taken by males, and by people high in verbalaggressiveness and low in interpersonal orientation. The relational orientation is taken by females, and by people low in verbal aggressiueness and high in argument avoidance and interpersonal orientation. Justification for using multiple arguments to instantiate each type of argument, and for using multiple situations was also found. UBLIC arguments originate in people's minds. Much of our scholarship on argumentation is focused on public texts. P Thus we identify warrants, or pair parts, or suppressed premises and write analyses of them. Certainly we can learn a lot about arguments in this way, but text-based research inherently subordinates the private origins to the public artifacts of argumentation. In fact, our impression is that the whole of textual scholarship about argument has very little to say about how people think of arguments. The line of research represented by this article is intended, if not as a corrective, at Dale Hample (Ph.D., University of Illinois, 1975) is a professor and Judith M. Dallinger