Recent concepts of addiction to drugs (e.g., cocaine) and non-drugs (e.g., gambling) have proposed that these behaviors are the product of an imbalance between three separate, but interacting, neural systems: (a) an impulsive, largely amygdala-striatum dependent, neural system that promotes automatic, habitual and salient behaviors; (b) a reflective, mainly prefrontal cortex dependent, neural system for decision-making, forecasting the future consequences of a behavior, and inhibitory control; and (c) the insula that integrates interoception states into conscious feelings and into decision-making processes that are involved in uncertain risk and reward. These systems account for poor decision-making (i.e., prioritizing short-term consequences of a decisional option) leading to more elevated addiction risk and relapse. This article provides neural evidence for this three-systems neural model of addiction.

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) involves probabilistic learning via monetary rewards and punishments, where advantageous task performance requires subjects to forego potential large immediate rewards for small longer-term rewards to avoid larger losses. Pathological gamblers (PG) perform worse on the IGT compared to controls, relating to their persistent preference toward high, immediate, and uncertain rewards despite experiencing larger losses. In this contribution, we review studies that investigated processes associated with poor IGT performance in PG. Findings from these studies seem to fit with recent neurocognitive models of addiction, which argue that the diminished ability of addicted individuals to ponder short-term against long-term consequences of a choice may be the product of an hyperactive automatic attentional and memory system for signaling the presence of addiction-related cues (e.g., high uncertain rewards associated with disadvantageous decks selection during the IGT) and for attributing to such cues pleasure and excitement. This incentive-salience associated with gambling-related choice in PG may be so high that it could literally “hijack” resources [“hot” executive functions (EFs)] involved in emotional self-regulation and necessary to allow the enactment of further elaborate decontextualized problem-solving abilities (“cool” EFs). A framework for future research is also proposed, which highlights the need for studies examining how these processes contribute specifically to the aberrant choice profile displayed by PG on the IGT.

According to the triadic neurocognitive model of addiction to drugs (e.g., cocaine) and non-drugs (e.g., gambling), weakened “willpower” associated with these behaviors is the product of an abnormal functioning in one or more of three key neural and cognitive systems: (1) an amygdala-striatum dependent system mediating automatic, habitual, and salient behaviors; (2) a prefrontal cortex dependent system important for self-regulation and forecasting the future consequences of a behavior; and (3) an insula dependent system for the reception of interoceptive signals and their translation into feeling states (such as urge and craving), which in turn plays a strong influential role in decision-making and impulse control processes related to uncertainty, risk, and reward. The described three-systems account for poor decision-making (i.e., prioritizing short-term consequences of a decisional option) and stimulus-driven actions, thus leading to a more elevated risk for relapse. Finally, this article elaborates on the need for “personalized” clinical model-based interventions targeting interactions between implicit processes, interoceptive signaling, and supervisory function aimed at helping individuals become less governed by immediate situations and automatic pre-potent responses, and more influenced by systems involved in the pursuit of future valued goals.

Background Alcohol dependence is associated with poor decision-making under ambiguity, that is, when decisions are to be made in the absence of known probabilities of reward and loss. However, little is known regarding decisions made by individuals with alcohol dependence in the context of known probabilities (decision under risk). In this study, we investigated the relative contribution of these distinct aspects of decision making to alcohol dependence. Methods Thirty recently detoxified and sober asymptomatic alcohol-dependent individuals, and thirty healthy control participants were tested for decision-making under ambiguity (using the Iowa Gambling Task), and decision-making under-risk (using the Cups Task and Coin Flipping Task). We also tested their capacities for working memory storage (Digit-span Forward), and dual-tasking (Operation-span Task). Results Compared to healthy control participants, alcohol-dependent individuals made disadvantageous decisions on the Iowa Gambling Task, reflecting poor decisions under ambiguity. They also made more risky choices on the Cups and Coin Flipping Tasks reflecting poor decision-making under risk. In addition, alcohol-dependent participants showed some working memory impairments, as measured by the dual tasking, and the degree of this impairment correlated with high-risk decision-making, thus suggesting a relationship between processes sub-serving working memory and risky decisions. Conclusion These results suggest that alcohol dependent individuals are impaired in their ability to decide optimally in multiple facets of uncertainty (i.e., both risk and ambiguity), and that at least some aspects of these deficits are linked to poor working memory processes.