This study examines how firms’ asymmetric cost behavior influences analysts’ earnings forecasts, primarily the accuracy of analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. Results indicate that firms with stickier cost behavior have less accurate analysts’ earnings forecasts than firms with less sticky cost behavior. Furthermore, findings show that cost stickiness influences analysts’ coverage priorities and investors appear to consider sticky cost behavior in forming their beliefs about the value of firms. This study integrates a typical management accounting research topic, cost behavior, with three standard financial accounting topics (namely, accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts, analysts’ coverage, and market response to earnings surprises).

This study explores motivations underlying managers’ resource adjustments. We focus on the impact of incentives to meet earnings targets on resource adjustments and the ensuing cost structures. We find that, when managers face incentives to avoid losses or earnings decreases, or to meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, they expedite downward adjustment of slack resources for sales decreases. These deliberate decisions lessen the degree of cost stickiness rather than induce cost stickiness. The results suggest that efforts to understand determinants of firms’ cost structures should be made in light of the managers’ motivations, particularly agency‐driven incentives underlying resource adjustment decisions.

Recent work in management accounting offers several novel insights into firms' cost behavior. This study explores whether financial analysts appropriately incorporate information on two types of cost behavior in predicting earnings—cost variability and cost stickiness. Since analysts' utilization of information is not directly observable, we model the process of earnings prediction to generate empirically testable hypotheses. The results indicate that analysts “converge to the average” in recognizing both cost variability and cost stickiness, resulting in substantial and systematic earnings forecast errors. Particularly, we find a clear pattern—inappropriate incorporation of available information on cost behavior in earnings forecasts leads to larger errors in unfavorable scenarios than in favorable ones. Overall, enhancing analysts' awareness of the expense side is likely to improve their earnings forecasts, mainly when sales turn to the worse. JEL Classifications: M41; M46; G12.

This note highlights a subtle aspect of the asymmetric costs literature not covered in the comprehensive review by Banker and Byzalov (2014). Specifically, we test the assertion underlying this literature that reported expenses can serve as an appropriate proxy for estimating the asymmetry of economic costs. Our findings refute this assertion, indicating that reporting choices influence the estimated asymmetry level of reported expenses. As a result, reported expenses are significantly more asymmetric (sticky) than economic costs. This evidence suggests that reporting choices required by GAAP matter in estimating cost stickiness. These findings enrich Banker and Byzalov (2014) by suggesting that future asymmetric costs research should (1) look for alternative accounting variables with the potential to capture economic costs, and (2) explore how various types of reporting choices affect asymmetric cost behavior.

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