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In this paper, we investigate the extent to which the presence of a large meatpacking (i.e., beef, pork, and broiler chicken) plant has affected county-level COVID-19 transmission dynamics. We find that—within 150 days after emergence of COVID-19 in a given county—the presence of a large beef packing facility increases per capita infection rates by 110%, relative to comparable counties without meatpacking plants. Large pork and chicken processing facilities increase transmission rates by 160% and 20%, respectively. While the presence of this type of industrial agricultural facility is shown to exacerbate initial disease transmission affecting large numbers of individuals in the community, over time daily case rates converge such that rates observed in meatpacking- and non-meatpacking counties become similar. In aggregate, results suggest that 334 thousand COVID-19 infections are attributable to meatpacking plants in the U.S. with associated mortality and morbidity costs totaling more than $11.2 billion.

This research investigates the extent to which financial incentives (conditional cash transfers) would induce Americans to opt for vaccination against coronavirus disease of 2019. We performed a randomized survey experiment with a representative sample of 1000 American adults in December 2020. Respondents were asked whether they would opt for vaccination under one of three incentive conditions ($1000, $1500, or $2000 financial incentive) or a no-incentive condition. We find that—without coupled financial incentives—only 58 per cent of survey respondents would elect for vaccination. A coupled financial incentive yields an 8-percentage-point increase in vaccine uptake relative to this baseline. The size of the cash transfer does not dramatically affect uptake rates. However, incentive responses differ dramatically by demographic group. Republicans were less responsive to financial incentives than the general population. For Black and Latino Americans especially, very large financial incentives may be counter-productive.

WTI and Brent crude oil futures are competing pricing benchmarks and they jockey for the number one position as the leading futures market. The price spread between WTI and Brent is also an important benchmark itself as the spread affects international trade in oil, refiner margins, and the price of refined products globally. In addition, the shapes of the WTI and Brent futures curves reflect supply and demand fundamentals in the U.S. versus the world market, respectively. On the analysis of the relationship between the two futures prices, we identify a structural break in the WTI-Brent price spread in January 2011 and a break in the corresponding shapes of the futures curves around the same time. The structural break was a consequence of a dramatic rise in U.S. production due to fracking, a series of supply disruptions in Europe, binding storage constraints, and the U.S. crude oil export ban. These events are studied in the context of a simulation model of world oil prices. We reproduce the stylized facts of the oil market and conclude that the 2011 break in pricing structure was consistent with standard commodity storage theory.

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