As be®ts two if its principal exponents, Hall and Taylor's recent article`Political science and the three new institutionalisms' provides a meticulous and provocative review of the many faces of the`new institutionalism' and a distinctive contribution to the growing literature in this area in its own right.* It provides an important opportunity to consider again the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary institutionalism and to raise the question of how its many insights might be more fully incorporated within the British political science mainstream. 1 While careful to distance themselves from the idea that a`crude synthesis' of rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism is`immediately practical or even necessarily desirable' ( p. 957), they suggest that a dialogue between them is both necessary and crucial. We argue that the prospects for such a dialogue are more limited than Hall and Taylor suggest. For, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms are based on mutually incompatible premises or`social ontologies'. Moreover, in identifying two social ontologies ± the calculus and cultural approaches ± within the historical institutionalist canon (and hence in reconstructing historical institutionalism in rational choice and sociological terms), we argue that Hall and Taylor do a considerable disservice to this distinctive approach to institutional analysis. While this view of historical institutionalism makes it appear`pivotal' to future dialogue between institutionalisms, such a reading neglects the potentially distinctive social ontology of this approach. This may leave historical institutionalism prone to precisely the tendential structuralism characteristic of much institutionalist analysis, while giving a super®cial impression that the approach has already overcome this problem. We argue that if institutionalism is to develop to its full potential, it must consider the relationship between structure and agency, on which Hall and Taylor merely touch, as a central analytic concern.

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The Leave majority recorded in England was decisive in determining the UK-wide referendum result. Brexit was made in England. We take this as a prompt to challenge the conventional Anglo-British mindset that animates most studies of 'British politics', and has shaped public attitudes research on the United Kingdom. We explore the persistence of distinctive Eurosceptic views in England and their relationship to English national identity prior to the referendum. We then model referendum vote choice using data from the Future of England Survey. Our analysis shows that immigration concerns played a major role in the Brexit referendum, alongside a general willingness to take risks, right-wing views, older age, and English national identity. So, Brexit was not just made in England, but Englishness was also a significant driver of the choice for Leave.

In the 1975 referendum England provided the strongest support for European integration, with a much smaller margin for membership in Scotland and Northern Ireland. By 2015 the rank order of ‘national’ attitudes to European integration had reversed. Now, England is the UK's most eurosceptic nation and may vote ‘Leave’, while Scotland seems set to generate a clear margin for ‘Remain’. The UK as a whole is a Brexit marginal. To understand the campaign, we need to make sense of the dynamics of public attitudes in each nation. We take an ‘archaeological’ approach to a limited evidence‐base, to trace the development of attitudes to Europe in England since 1975. We find evidence of a link between English nationalism and euroscepticism. Whatever the result in 2016, contrasting outcomes in England and Scotland will exacerbate tensions in the UK's territorial constitution and could lead to the break‐up of Britain.

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