As of March 2016, 4.8 million Syrian refugees were scattered in two dozen countries by the civil war. Refugee smuggling has been a major catalyst of human trafficking in the Middle East and Europe migrant crises. Data on the extent to which smuggling devolved into trafficking in this refugee wave is, however, scarce. This article investigates how Syrian refugees interact with smugglers, shedding light on how human smuggling and human trafficking interrelated on the Balkan Route. I rely on original evidence from in-depth interviews (n = 123) and surveys (n = 100) with Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, Greece, Serbia, and Germany; as well as ethnographic observations in thirty-five refugee camps or other sites in these countries. I argue that most smugglers functioned as guides, informants, and allies in understudied ways-thus refugee perceptions diverge dramatically from government policy assumptions. I conclude with a recommendation for a targeted advice policy that would acknowledge the reality of migrant-smuggler relations, and more effectively curb trafficking instead of endangering refugees.

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The role of smuggling in forced migration has been a leading policy challenge of the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East. This study investigates how anti‐smuggling government policies have shaped migratory risks for Syrian refugees in five countries: Jordan, Turkey, Greece, Serbia and Germany. Original evidence from in‐depth interviews (n=123), surveys (n=100), expert interviews (n=75) and ethnography reveal that government anti‐smuggler policies have: (a) endangered Syrian refugees by shifting risk from smugglers to their clients; (b) distorted refugees’ perceptions of risk, and; (c) decreased refugees’ confidence in government representatives while increasing dependence on smugglers. These data are unique in scope and topic, expanding the existing literature with an emphasis on understudied experiences during migration. The paper concludes with a policy recommendation that acknowledges the reality of smugglers’ role in forced migrants’ decisions, offering a pragmatic alternative of strategic pre‐emption of smugglers.

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