The article examines traditional understanding of top-down organizational leadership against spontaneous, self-initiated leadership/followership theory. It also denotes the relationship between spontaneous and self-initiated expression of alternative, grassroots, and rogue leadership as a construct of alternating leadership behaviors. The research furthers the leadership research focus that is identified as Alternating Leadership and acknowledges leader/follower dual function within each individual. The constructs are augmented by a matrix that contrasts the strength of the leadership and followership roles among traditional versus non-traditional leadership theories. Conclusions suggest a confirmation of the dual Alternating Leadership role existing within all employees or managers and the creation of worker-centered, real-time interventions to increase employee interaction and synergy. The impact of generational leadership on the AlternatingLeadership Model is also examined.

No abstract

The current events at Hewlett-Packard (HP) offer steadfast corporate governance professionals a new case study concerning: (1) the powers of the Board, (2) the role of the Chair, and (3) the expectation by individual directors to expect boardroom due process to redress issues. While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) changed the requirements for transparency and financial disclosure for the CEO and CFO, it remained too silent concerning director-to-director transparency and the role of the Chair to take action without full board consent. This is a re-occurring directorship problem as Enron, Disney, and other exigent cases show. These cases point to the need for director-to-director transparency and disclosure if board members are to avoid unsubstantial board action.

The issue of U.S. corporate governance has been approached as a management structure without regard for the non-hierarchical oversight qualities that are embedded in the legal foundation of its birth. This paper reviews the: (1) U.S. federal Model Business Corporation that unifies the individual state corporate enabling statutes; and (2) The Delaware General Corporation Law that applies to over half of the U.S. Fortune 500 companies and posits the structure of U.S. corporate governance is nonhierarchical, though practiced hierarchically. Further, it is not always the full board that creates board action, and asymmetrical communication and asymmetrical member action create the conditions for vacuous voting.

The future will provide the lesson about the effects of Board declassification. Yet, without question, declassification does degrade the synergy needed to build learning and decision-making symmetry, and it makes these part-time professionals, a temporary and potentially short-term member of a decision-making community. As a poison pill, this strategy remains questionable. Clearly, the alchemy of providing excellent oversight that generates great business outcomes is not the mandate of declassification. Declassification is a re-structuring strategy only. Real alchemy comes from a great deal of knowledge,, and sprinkle of luck, but remains unlinked to potentially changing the seats in the chairs after each election. Perhaps corporate governance restructuring should begin to address the real problem, which is positioning Directors to be knowledgeable, accountable, and ethical fiduciaries