In the first half of this paper, I argue that essential properties are intrinsic and that this permits a modal analysis of essence that is immune to the sort of objections raised by Fine (1994). In the second half, I argue that intrinsic properties collectively have a certain structure and that this accounts for some observations about essences: that things are essentially determinate; that things often have properties within a certain range essentially; and that the essential properties of things are their core properties.

I propose an analysis of the metaphysically important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and, in the process, provide a neglected model for the analysis of recalcitrant distinctions generally. First, I recap some difficulties with Kim's well-known (1982) proposal and its recent descendants. Then I define two independence relations among properties and state a 'quasi-logical' analysis of the distinction in terms of them. Unusually, my proposal is holistic, but I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium and so probably pins down the target distinction uniquely. Finally, I suggest diagnoses of the previous failed attempts to analyse the distinction. We intuitively distinguish 'intrinsic' from 'extrinsic' properties. Roughly, any property whose instantiation by some individual is a matter of the nature of that individual alone, regardless of the nature or existence of any distinct individual, is intrinsic; all other properties are extrinsic. 1 So, for example, redness, roundness and being 3kg are intrinsic, while being one metre away, being the fattest, and being an uncle are extrinsic. This distinction is important to metaphysics in several ways. One is that it marks the difference between 'genuine' and 'mere Cambridge' changes: genuine changes are changes in intrinsic properties; mere Cambridge changes are changes only in extrinsic properties. Another is that it marks the difference between 'qualitative' and 'numerical' identity: qualitative identity is the sharing of intrinsic properties; numerical identity is the sharing of all properties, intrinsic and extrinsic alike. A third is that it marks the borders of 'modal recombination': the intrinsic properties of distinct individuals, unlike their extrinsic properties, can vary independently of one another. 2 In this paper I attempt to analyse this distinction. My proposal is 'quasi-logical': it is couched solely in terms of logical, mereological, modal, and set-theoretical notions. This renders the distinction precise 1 Here and in what follows 'distinct' means 'wholly distinct', that is, having no parts in common, and 'individual' means 'concrete part of some possible world' (so mereological sums of individuals from distinct worlds, if such there be, are not individuals). 2 Vallentyne (1997) points out the involvement of the distinction in change and identity.

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Our knowledge of the most basic alternative possibilities can be thought of as generated recursively from what we know about the actual world. But what are the generating principles? According to one view, they are recombinational: roughly, alternative possibilities are generated by ''patching together'' parts of distinct worlds or ''blotting out'' parts of worlds to yield new worlds. I argue that this view is inadequate. It is difficult to state in a way that is true and non-trivial, and anyway fails to account for our knowledge that there might have been other things, properties, relations, and combinations of these than there actually are. I sketch and defend an alternative view based on the distinction between determinable and determinate properties: roughly, alternative possibilities are generated by ''intra-determinable'' variation, variation from one determinate to another of the same determinable.