The Distinction between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties

Abstract

I propose an analysis of the metaphysically important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and, in the process, provide a neglected model for the analysis of recalcitrant distinctions generally. First, I recap some difficulties with Kim's well-known (1982) proposal and its recent descendants. Then I define two independence relations among properties and state a 'quasi-logical' analysis of the distinction in terms of them. Unusually, my proposal is holistic, but I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium and so probably pins down the target distinction uniquely. Finally, I suggest diagnoses of the previous failed attempts to analyse the distinction. We intuitively distinguish 'intrinsic' from 'extrinsic' properties. Roughly, any property whose instantiation by some individual is a matter of the nature of that individual alone, regardless of the nature or existence of any distinct individual, is intrinsic; all other properties are extrinsic. 1 So, for example, redness, roundness and being 3kg are intrinsic, while being one metre away, being the fattest, and being an uncle are extrinsic. This distinction is important to metaphysics in several ways. One is that it marks the difference between 'genuine' and 'mere Cambridge' changes: genuine changes are changes in intrinsic properties; mere Cambridge changes are changes only in extrinsic properties. Another is that it marks the difference between 'qualitative' and 'numerical' identity: qualitative identity is the sharing of intrinsic properties; numerical identity is the sharing of all properties, intrinsic and extrinsic alike. A third is that it marks the borders of 'modal recombination': the intrinsic properties of distinct individuals, unlike their extrinsic properties, can vary independently of one another. 2 In this paper I attempt to analyse this distinction. My proposal is 'quasi-logical': it is couched solely in terms of logical, mereological, modal, and set-theoretical notions. This renders the distinction precise 1 Here and in what follows 'distinct' means 'wholly distinct', that is, having no parts in common, and 'individual' means 'concrete part of some possible world' (so mereological sums of individuals from distinct worlds, if such there be, are not individuals). 2 Vallentyne (1997) points out the involvement of the distinction in change and identity.

An Analysis of Intrinsicality

“…Lewis's other three accounts are given in Lewis (1983), Langton and Lewis (1998) and Lewis (2001) respectively. Other accounts of intrinsicality that have been proposed include: Weatherson (2001), Vallentyne (1997), Yablo (1999), Denby (2006Denby ( , 2010, Witmer et al (2005), Trogdon (2009), Francescotti (1999, Rosen (2010) and Bader (2013). Marshall (2012Marshall ( , 2013Marshall ( , 2015Marshall ( , 2014 and Weatherson and Marshall (2013) provides an extended argument that all of these accounts are unsuccessful.…”

Primitivism about Intrinsicality

“…Similarly when one looks at the details of accounts that set mereological restrictions on the ways of modally recombining properties and property instantiations, which are taken to generate the set of intrinsic properties (e.g. Weatherson 2001 andDenby 2006). Or that set mereological restrictions on the kinds of objects that cannot be 'removed' from or 'ignored' in a thing's environment without also varying that thing's intrinsic properties (e.g., Vallentyne 1997, Yablo 1999, and Figdor 2008.…”

“…The reductivist may grasp hold of this observation, and note that the presence of a past track record of failure may have more to do with mismatch between the reductive analysis offered on one hand and the platitude and/or notion 18 Talk of "quasi" or "broadly logical" notions in this context, and argument that any such account must fail, comes from Sider (1996) and Marshall (2009), respectively. For dissent, see Vallentyne (1997), Yablo (1999), Denby (2006);and Hoffmann (2010); for discussion of whether the accounts contained in these works are both broadly logical and successful, see Weatherson and Marshall (2012) and Marshall (forthcoming-a).…”

Platonic Dispositionalism

“…Surprisingly, though, when we try to give a precise definition of the concept of intrinsicness, the task turns out to be more challenging than might be expected (e.g. see Langton andLewis 1998 andDenby 2006). For our purposes, however, the following rough definition will suffice to capture the main intuition about intrinsicness.…”