The authors hypothesized that uncertainty following a positive event prolongs the pleasure it causes and that people are generally unaware of this effect of uncertainty. In 3 experimental settings, people experienced a positive event (e.g., received an unexpected gift of a dollar coin attached to an index card) under conditions of certainty or uncertainty (e.g., it was easy or difficult to make sense of the text on the card). As predicted, people's positive moods lasted longer in the uncertain conditions. The results were consistent with a pleasure paradox, whereby the cognitive processes used to make sense of positive events reduce the pleasure people obtain from them. Forecasters seemed unaware of this paradox; they overwhelmingly preferred to be in the certain conditions and tended to predict that they would be in better moods in these conditions.

Do approach-avoidance actions create attitudes? Prior influential studies suggested that rudimentary attitudes could be established by simply pairing novel stimuli (Chinese ideographs) with arm flexion (approach) or arm extension (avoidance). In three experiments, we found that approach-avoidance actions alone were insufficient to account for such effects. Instead, we found that these affective influences resulted from the interaction of these actions with a priori differences in stimulus valence. Thus, with negative stimuli, the effect of extension on attitude was more positive than the effect of flexion. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the affect from motivationally compatible or incompatible action can also influence task evaluations. A final experiment, using Chinese ideographs from the original studies, confirmed these findings. Both approach and avoidance actions led to more positive evaluations of the ideographs when the actions were motivationally compatible with the prior valence of the ideographs. The attitudinal impact of approach-avoidance action thus reflects its situated meaning, which depends on the valence of stimuli being approached or avoided.

In five studies, we examined the effects on cognitive performance of coherence and incoherence between conceptual and experiential sources of affective information. The studies crossed the priming of happy and sad concepts with affective experiences. In different experiments, these included: approach or avoidance actions, happy or sad feelings, and happy or sad expressive behaviors. In all studies, coherence between affective concepts and affective experiences led to better recall of a story than affective incoherence. We suggested that the experience of such experiential affective cues serves as evidence of the appropriateness of affective concepts that come to mind. The results suggest that affective coherence has epistemic benefits, and that incoherence is costly, for cognitive performance.

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Does simple displeasure cause anger without appraisals or agency attributions? The authors offer 8 observations: (a) Appraisal theory also predicts that displeasure promotes anger, (b) An emotion of frustration can be usefully distinguished from anger, (c) Aggressive reactions to norm violations among animals suggest that they too distinguish bad behavior from bad outcomes, (d) Attributions to agency are perceptual and automatic in social situations, (e) It is tenuous to argue that agency attributions are enacted in angry aggression, but absent in anger elicitation. (f) The contextualized meanings of expressive movements, rather than movements themselves, elicit emotion, (g) Expressions may be better seen as constituents than as causes of emotions, (h) Cognitive components of emotion generally come before, not after, eliciting events.