Affective incoherence: When affective concepts and embodied reactions clash.

Abstract

In five studies, we examined the effects on cognitive performance of coherence and incoherence between conceptual and experiential sources of affective information. The studies crossed the priming of happy and sad concepts with affective experiences. In different experiments, these included: approach or avoidance actions, happy or sad feelings, and happy or sad expressive behaviors. In all studies, coherence between affective concepts and affective experiences led to better recall of a story than affective incoherence. We suggested that the experience of such experiential affective cues serves as evidence of the appropriateness of affective concepts that come to mind. The results suggest that affective coherence has epistemic benefits, and that incoherence is costly, for cognitive performance.

Too close for comfort: Stimulus valence moderates the influence of motivational orientation on distance perception.

“…This effect was driven by participants perceiving incompatible words as closer than compatible words, presumably because incompatibility motivated the goal of resolving the inconsistency between discrepant affective information (e.g. Centerbar et al, 2008) that was reflected in their visual perception, whereas compatibility marked an absence of the goal. This finding is thus in line with the motivated perception account, which posits that motivation associated with a goal makes goal-related stimuli seem closer, or larger (Veltkamp et al, 2008, Balcetis & Dunning, 2007.…”

“…This disrupts the ability to appropriately process the stimulus, thus creating an epistemic disadvantage that may decrease the person's capacity to effectively respond to the stimulus and the surrounding environment (e.g. Centerbar et al, 2008;Neumann & Strack, 2000). Therefore, a person in this state may be motivated to resolve the epistemic inconsistency by extracting further meaning from the stimulus, which may be necessary in establishing appropriate behavioral responses to be undertaken if an opportunity for action arises.…”

“…Based on previous work (e.g. Centerbar et al, 2008;Balcetis & Dunning, 2007, Harmon-Jones et al, 2009, we propose that stimuli incompatible with motivational orientation are seen as closer than compatible stimuli because they motivate the goal of resolving the inconsistency arising from discrepant affective information. For example, when an avoidance-oriented person sees a positive stimulus, such as a delicious cake, the person's motivational orientation clashes with the affective value of the stimulus.…”

“…As suggested by research showing that incompatibility between motivational orientation and valence evokes a goal-related motivational state (Centerbar et al, 2008) and by the motivated perception account positing that goal-related motivation influences visual perception (e.g. Balcetis & Dunning, 2007), Experiments 1 to 3 tested whether stimuli incompatible with motivational orientation are perceived as closer than compatible stimuli.…”

“…Building on the feelings-as-evidence model (Clore & Gasper, 2000), Centerbar, Schnall, Clore and Garvin (2008;see also Clore & Schnall, 2008) proposed that people rely on bodily experiences associated with motivational orientation to validate the affective valence of stimuli. Thus, evoking motivational orientation compatible with a positive or negative stimulus confirms that this stimulus is indeed positive or negative.…”