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that p is true). The central moral question about the relation oflying and deceiving is therefore this: Is there a general moral difference between misleading people copyright.

John McDowell begins his essay ‘Knowledge by Hearsay’ (1993) by describing two ways language matters to epistemology. The first is that, by understanding and accepting someone else's utterance, a person can acquire knowledge. This is what philosophers call ‘knowledge by testimony’. The second is that children acquire knowledge in the course of learning their first language—in acquiring language, a child inherits a conception of the world. In The Formation of Reason (2011), and my writings on Russian socio‐historical philosophy and psychology, I address issues bearing on the second of these topics, questions about the child's development through initiation into language and other forms of social being. In this article, I focus on the first: the epistemology of testimony. After expounding a view of testimony inspired by McDowell, and supplemented by ideas from Sebastian Rödl, I consider how such an account illuminates two issues in philosophy of education: the extent of an individual's epistemic dependence upon others, and the nature of teaching.

This paper considers the style of moral philosophy that emerged in the mid‐1970s in the writings of John McDowell and David Wiggins and examines its implications for moral education. After characterising the position, I examine whether it broadens or narrows the horizons of moral philosophy. Though McDowell's notorious quietism might suggest the latter, I argue that Wiggins offers a more expansive vision. I then explore how the view might be developed—drawing, for example, on the work of Jonathan Dancy and Alice Crary—before turning to a discussion of moral education informed by Iris Murdoch's conception of the cultivation of moral vision. The outcome, I hope, exemplifies the ‘meet’ between philosophical reflection and moral life to which Wiggins aspires.