Animal experiments have shown that non-human primates, cats, ferrets, hamsters, rabbits and bats can be infected by SARS-CoV-2. In addition, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected in felids, mink and dogs in the field. Here, we describe an in-depth investigation using whole genome sequencing of outbreaks on 16 mink farms and the humans living or working on these farms. We conclude that the virus was initially introduced from humans and has since evolved, most likely reflecting widespread circulation among mink in the beginning of the infection period several weeks prior to detection. Despite enhanced biosecurity, early warning surveillance and immediate culling of infected farms, transmission occurred between mink farms in three big transmission clusters with unknown modes of transmission. Sixty-eight percent (68%) of the tested mink farm residents, employees and/or contacts had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Where whole genomes were available, these persons were infected with strains with an animal sequence signature, providing evidence of animal to human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within mink farms.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a serious threat to global public health, but obtaining representative data on AMR for healthy human populations is difficult. Here, we use metagenomic analysis of untreated sewage to characterize the bacterial resistome from 79 sites in 60 countries. We find systematic differences in abundance and diversity of AMR genes between Europe/North-America/Oceania and Africa/Asia/South-America. Antimicrobial use data and bacterial taxonomy only explains a minor part of the AMR variation that we observe. We find no evidence for cross-selection between antimicrobial classes, or for effect of air travel between sites. However, AMR gene abundance strongly correlates with socio-economic, health and environmental factors, which we use to predict AMR gene abundances in all countries in the world. Our findings suggest that global AMR gene diversity and abundance vary by region, and that improving sanitation and health could potentially limit the global burden of AMR. We propose metagenomic analysis of sewage as an ethically acceptable and economically feasible approach for continuous global surveillance and prediction of AMR.

Background 10 days after the first reported case of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection in the Netherlands (on Feb 27, 2020), 55 (4%) of 1497 health-care workers in nine hospitals located in the south of the Netherlands had tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA. We aimed to gain insight in possible sources of infection in health-care workers.Methods We did a cross-sectional study at three of the nine hospitals located in the south of the Netherlands. We screened health-care workers at the participating hospitals for SARS-CoV-2 infection, based on clinical symptoms (fever or mild respiratory symptoms) in the 10 days before screening. We obtained epidemiological data through structured interviews with health-care workers and combined this information with data from whole-genome sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 in clinical samples taken from health-care workers and patients. We did an in-depth analysis of sources and modes of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in health-care workers and patients. FindingsBetween March 2 and March 12, 2020, 1796 (15%) of 12 022 health-care workers were screened, of whom 96 (5%) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. We obtained complete and near-complete genome sequences from 50 healthcare workers and ten patients. Most sequences were grouped in three clusters, with two clusters showing local circulation within the region. The noted patterns were consistent with multiple introductions into the hospitals through community-acquired infections and local amplification in the community.Interpretation Although direct transmission in the hospitals cannot be ruled out, our data do not support widespread nosocomial transmission as the source of infection in patients or health-care workers.

, a cluster of cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology were reported linked to a market in Wuhan, China 1. The causative agent was identified as the species Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus and was named SARS-CoV-2 (ref. 2). By 16 April the virus had spread to 185 different countries, infected over 2,000,000 people and resulted in over 130,000 deaths 3. In the Netherlands, the first case of SARS-CoV-2 was notified on 27 February. The outbreak started with several different introductory events from Italy, Austria, Germany and France followed by local amplification in, and later also outside, the south of the Netherlands. The combination of near to real-time whole-genome sequence analysis and epidemiology resulted in reliable assessments of the extent of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the community, facilitating early decision-making to control local transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the Netherlands. We demonstrate how these data were generated and analyzed, and how SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing, in combination with epidemiological data, was used to inform public health decision-making in the Netherlands. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) is a powerful tool to understand the transmission dynamics of outbreaks and inform outbreak control decisions 4-7. Evidence of this was seen during the 2014-2016 West African Ebola outbreak when real-time WGS was used to help public health decision-making, a strategy dubbed 'precision public health pathogen genomics' 8,9. Immediate sharing and analysis of data during outbreaks is now recommended as an integral part of outbreak response 10-12. Feasibility of real-time WGS requires access to sequence platforms that provide reliable sequences, access to metadata for interpretation, and data analysis at high speed and low cost. Therefore, WGS for outbreak support is an active area of research. Nanopore sequencing has been employed in recent outbreaks of Usutu, Ebola, Zika and yellow fever virus owing to the ease of use and relatively low start-up cost 4-7. The robustness of this method has recently been validated using Usutu virus 13,14. In the Netherlands, the first COVID-19 case was confirmed on 27 February and WGS was performed in near to real-time using an amplicon-based sequencing approach. From 22 January, symptomatic travelers from countries where SARS-CoV-2 was known to circulate were routinely tested. The first case of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the Netherlands was identified on 27 February in a person with recent travel history to Italy and an additional case was identified one day later, also in a person with recent travel history to Italy. The genomes of these first two positive samples were generated and analyzed by 29 February. These two viruses clustered differently in the phylogenetic tree, confirming separate introductions (Fig. 1a). The advice to test hospitalized patients with serious respiratory infections was issued on 24 February and subsequent attempts to identify possible local transmission chains triggered testing for SARS-CoV-2 on a large scale in h...