Why put emotion into games? The answers are art and money. Sure, it's an unholy alliance, but so are pineapple and pizza, windmills and tiny golf courses, the military and intelligence, and canned fruit and gelatin molds. Don't get me wrong. I think of myself as an artist first and a businessman second. But game companies that don't make a profit aren't game companies for very long. There are at least nine reasons that putting emotion in games can lead to greater profits, and it's worth taking a few minutes to mention them.

We study the effect of embedding pairwise choices between lotteries within a choice list on measured risk attitude. Using an experiment with online workers, we find that subjects choose the risky lottery rather than a sure payment significantly more often when responding to a choice list. This behavior can be rationalized by the interaction between nonexpected utility and the random incentive system, as suggested by Karni and Safra (1987).

This article characterises the behavioural content of a model of choice under risk with reference-dependent preferences and endogenous expectations-based reference points based on the preferred personal equilibrium model of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). The combination of reference-dependent preferences and endogenous reference points leads to violations of the Independence Axiom and can also lead to violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. An axiomatic characterisation shows that the model places testable restrictions on choice under risk.

We study three procedures to elicit attitudes towards delayed payments: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure; the second price auction; and the multiple price list. The payment mechanisms associated with these methods are widely considered as incentive compatible, thus if preferences satisfy Procedure Invariance, which is also widely (and often implicitly) assumed, they should yield identical time preference distributions. We find instead that the monetary discount rates elicited using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure are significantly lower than those elicited with a multiple price list. We show that the behavior we observe is consistent with an existing psychological explanation of preference reversals.J.E.L. codes: C91, D9

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