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Sudan is approaching the end of a peace process whose origins in some respects began soon after the collapse in 1983 of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the resumption of civil war. An estimated two million Sudanese, primarily Southerners, have died since 1983 of famine, disease and the direct consequences of the renewed fighting. Following the failure of a number of discrete peace initiatives, the Intergovernmental Authority on Deve lopment (IGAD) took responsibility in 1993 for bringing the Sudanese civil war to an end. Mediators from IGAD countries outlined in 1994 a Declaration of Principles (DOP) for ending the civil war. The DOP endorsed the right of the South to self-determination and creation of a secular society throughout the country. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) almost immediately accepted the DOP. The Government of Sudan (GOS) initially rejected it and only in 1997 agreed to accept it as a basis for negotiations. IGAD eventually authorized Kenya to take the lead in the Sudan peace process; early Kenyan leadership was episodic and half-hearted. IGAD reinvigorated the process late in 2001 under a new Kenyan team capably led by Lt. Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo. The next breakthrough was the Machakos Protocol in July 2002 that laid out a roadmap for a comprehensive peace agreement involving the GOS and the SPLM/A. A series of six protocols and agreements on individual issues followed the Machakos Protocol. After two additional years of intense negotiations, the process has become known as Naivasha for the town in Kenya where some of the talks took place. The crisis in Darfur in Western Sudan and a few unresolved issues have prevented the parties as of this writing ! from reaching a final, comprehensive peace agreement. The GOS and the SPLM/A almost certainly had in mind the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement as they struggled to negotiate numerous contentious issues, some of them not significantly changed from the time of Sudan's first internal struggle that began in 1955 and ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. This is an opportune time to revisit the Addis Ababa Agreement 1. Text written in late 2004.

is as comprehensive as its title suggests. Book Review: China and Africa: A Century of Engagement Increased aid, debt cancellation, and a boom in Chinese-African trade, with a strategic Chinese. Accordingly, China's rapidly increasing engagement in Africa does not so much reflect Sino-African interaction in the twenty-first century', in. Jun 29, 2012. The speaker presented his new book, China and Africa: A Century of. Engagement, co-authored with the sinologist Joshua Eisenman. New China and Africa A Century of Engagement by David H Shinn. engagement. *. In their book, China and Africa: a century of engagement, David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman provide an account of the relationship between China in Africa-Foreign Policy Association The increased Chinese attention to Africa has been one of the region's big stories during the last decade, not least because it seemed to come just as the West .

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From Mao Zedong’s seizure of power in 1949 until the early 1990s, China focused more intensely on its political relationship with Africa than its economic ties. During this period China was more concerned about support for African liberation movements, competition with Taiwan, the ‘One China’ principle, and dealing with internal challenges such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The Deng Xiaoping era witnessed a reduction of China’s engagement in Africa while the Jiang Zemin period set the stage for significant advancement. By Hu Jintao’s arrival early in the twenty-first century, the China–Africa relationship had become based predominantly on economic interests, especially China’s desire to access African raw materials. It began with trade and expanded into Chinese outward investment in Africa. By 2009, China had overtaken the United States as Africa’s largest trading partner. So far, the Xi Jinping era has resulted in a greater focus on protection of Chinese interests in Africa, security cooperation, and a levelling off and even decline in China’s economic engagement.