Al Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somalia

Shinn, David H.

doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2011.01.003

Cited by 38 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Legality and the presence of a brutal civil war prior to the declaration of independence are, however, not the only normative aspects connected to the issue of Somaliland independence. First, there is an issue of the constitutional referendum that was unilaterally held in 2001 and during which 97.1 percent of the voters supported the independence of the entity (Shinn ). Second, the entity is in many respects more efficient than the central government—which is to a large degree dependent upon direct foreign support for its very survival (see Fergusson ) .…”

Section: Case Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power and Recognition: How (Super)Powers Decide the International Recognition Process

Riegl

Doboš

2018

Politics & Policy

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The article offers a modified theoretical approach toward the issue of secession and international recognition. Based on the novel political theory of secession as presented by Milena Sterio and the measurement of external involvement in secessionist attempts as researched by Alexis Heraclides, the article provides a theoretical model of modified (super)power rule. The article, based on preliminary conclusions from an internal dataset of secessionist attempts between 1946 and 2016 containing 63 items, argues that effective (super)power support is a sufficient condition for the de facto independence of any secessionist entity. The model is tested on cases of Somaliland, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Kosovo, and Transnistria. Related Articles Related Media MackieMesser. . “The Coconut Revolution.” http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2x5eul KurtRickerd. . “Katanga, the Untold Story (of UN Betrayal).” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvgBvwfW5Dw XBN. . “Transnistria: Places that Don't Exist.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiioOj85X9E Vice News. . “The Sahara's Forgotten War.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ju4WrjiJbGc

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Section: Case Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power and Recognition: How (Super)Powers Decide the International Recognition Process

Riegl

Doboš

2018

Politics & Policy

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“…The attacks at Garissa University occurred against a backdrop of a spate of al-Shabaab terrorist attacks that have targeted Kenya since 2008-when al-Shabaab launched its first attack in the country (Pate, et al, 2015). Al-Shabaab, with ties to various terrorist groups including al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State (IS), is based in Somalia, though its members and recruits come from multiple continents and countries, to include Kenya (Shinn, 2011;Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2015). Kenya has experienced more than 200 attacks at the hands of al-Shabaab terrorists in places ranging from the big cities of Nairobi and Mombasa to the small hamlet of Mpeketoni and a rock quarry outside the town of Mandera (Pate, et al, 2015).…”

Section: A Background On Kenya's Border Wallmentioning

confidence: 99%

Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya’s Proposed Border Wall with Somalia

Cannon

2016

Journal of Terrorism Research

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Addressing border security appears to be a plausible approach for states that suffer from terrorism. Kenya's border wall is to keep terrorists out of Kenya. Utilizing a comparative approach, this paper explores the efficacy of border walls, particularly Kenya's wall with Somalia. Findings show that walls rarely accomplish stated goals and have unintended consequences. In Kenya's case, it may reignite border disputes and separate communities. The success of Kenya's border wall is low given the high levels of corruption and the fact that walls have been demonstrated to only be as good as the people who guard them.H einous acts call for desperate countermeasures. The killing in cold blood on April 2, 2015 of 147 students at Garissa University in Kenya, by a handful of terrorists affiliated with the al-Shabaab terrorist group, has led Kenyan authorities to resort to building a wall along its border with Somalia in an effort to stem future attacks. The decision to construct a security wall occurred against a backdrop of the public rage and anguish felt in Kenya following the attack and compounded by repeated al-Shabaab attacks in the country since 2008. Kenyan authorities' fixation with ostensibly penning in al-Shabaab terrorists and keeping them out of Kenya dominated discourse about the suitability of a border wall. Al-Shabaab's leaders and most of its terrorist training camps are based in Somalia. The terrorists who conducted the attacks at Garissa University came from Somalia and ostensibly acted under the direction of al-Shabaab leadership.When Kenya announced it was building a wall, questions were immediately raised regarding the effectiveness of such an expensive venture. However, the debate about constructing the border barrier did not consider or entertain key questions including the likely geopolitical repercussions such as migration in the region, separating communities and clans that have co-existed and depended on each other for hundreds of years and long-simmering border disputes with Kenya's neighbours, some of which have periodically fed Somali irredentism. This paper utilizes international security theories and a comparative political science approach in analysing the efficacy of Kenya's proposed border wall with Somalia as a strategy for containing al-Shabaab and preventing future terrorist attacks in the country. Existing evidence suggests that the proposed wall, if completed, will exacerbate an already volatile situation by reigniting border disputes not only between Somalia and Kenya; but could also provide precedent for other states in the region to raise claims over borders that were drawn by colonial powers. The proposed border also will artificially separate communities and clans who live on either side of the border and negatively affect existing and legitimate social, cultural, economic and political cross-border exchanges. Lastly, this paper argues that the chances of success of the JTR, Volume 7, Issue 2-May 2016 Kenya/Somalia border wall (keeping out terrorists) are miniscule, given the h...

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“…Some scholars argue that radical Islamist tendencies have been visible in Somalia since the 1960s. 54 Most, however, trace the rise of the Wahhabi strand of Islam in Somalia to the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and the subsequent rise of Saudi-funded madrassas (Muslim schools) and Islamic charitable institutions as the primary provider of Somalis' welfare, educational and health services.…”

Section: The Insurgents: Harakat Al-shabaab the Rise Of Al-shabaabmentioning

confidence: 99%

Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013

Bruton¹,

Williams²

2014

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Al Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somalia

Cited by 38 publications

References 0 publications

Power and Recognition: How (Super)Powers Decide the International Recognition Process

Power and Recognition: How (Super)Powers Decide the International Recognition Process

Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya’s Proposed Border Wall with Somalia

Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013

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