The Gram-negative bacteria Klebsiella pneumoniae is a major cause of nosocomial infections, primarily among immunocompromised patients. The emergence of strains resistant to carbapenems has left few treatment options, making infection containment critical. In 2011, the U.S. National Institutes of Health Clinical Center experienced an outbreak of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae that affected 18 patients, 11 of whom died. Whole-genome sequencing was performed on K. pneumoniae isolates to gain insight into why the outbreak progressed despite early implementation of infection control procedures. Integrated genomic and epidemiological analysis traced the outbreak to three independent transmissions from a single patient who was discharged 3 weeks before the next case became clinically apparent. Additional genomic comparisons provided evidence for unexpected transmission routes, with subsequent mining of epidemiological data pointing to possible explanations for these transmissions. Our analysis demonstrates that integration of genomic and epidemiological data can yield actionable insights and facilitate the control of nosocomial transmission.

Two ligands have been synthesized by derivatisation of cyanuric chloride: 6-(diethylamino)-2,4-disulfanyl-1,3,5triazine (H 2 SSta) 1 and 6-(diethylamino)-2-hydroxo-4-sulfanyl-1,3,5-triazine (H 2 OSta) 2 have been characterised by X-ray crystallography, which shows intermolecular hydrogen bonding in the solid state, leading to dimers of 1 and ribbons of 2. On reaction with metal salts both ligands undergo oligomerisation reactions. Compound 1 reacts with nickel chloride to form a mononuclear complex, [Ni{(Sta)S(S 2 ta)}] 3. In 3 two triazine ligands have reacted, to form a tetradentate ligand in which two triazine rings are bridged by a sulfur group, with a co-ordinated disulfide group present on one ring and a co-ordinated thiolate on the second. Compound 2 reacts with cobalt() chloride to form a cage complex, [Co 6 NaO(OStaH) This complicated structure contains two polydentate ligands formed by linking triazine groups through a bridging sulfur. The cage contains four cobalt() and two cobalt() sites which are assigned by bond length considerations. The compound [Co(OSta) 3 ] 5 co-crystallises with 4, and its structure has also been determined.

Public health officials have raised concerns that plasmid transfer between Enterobacteriaceae species may spread resistance to carbapenems, an antibiotic class of last resort, thereby rendering common healthcare-associated infections nearly impossible to treat. We performed comprehensive surveillance and genomic sequencing to identify carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae in the NIH Clinical Center patient population and hospital environment in order to to articulate the diversity of carbapenemase-encoding plasmids and survey the mobility of and assess the mobility of these plasmids between bacterial species. We isolated a repertoire of carbapenemase-encoding Enterobacteriaceae, including multiple strains of Klebsiella pneumoniae, Klebsiella oxytoca, Escherichia coli, Enterobacter cloacae, Citrobacter freundii, and Pantoea species. Long-read genome sequencing with full end-to-end assembly revealed that these organisms carry the carbapenem-resistance genes on a wide array of plasmids. Klebsiella pneumoniae and Enterobacter cloacae isolated simultaneously from a single patient harbored two different carbapenemase-encoding plasmids, overriding the epidemiological scenario of plasmid transfer between organisms within this patient. We did, however, find evidence supporting horizontal transfer of carbapenemase-encoding plasmids between Klebsiella pneumoniae, Enterobacter cloacae and Citrobacter freundii in the hospital environment. Our comprehensive sequence data, with full plasmid identification, challenges assumptions about horizontal gene transfer events within patients and identified wider possible connections between patients and the hospital environment. In addition, we identified a new carbapenemase-encoding plasmid of potentially high clinical impact carried by Klebsiella pneumoniae, Escherichia coli, Enterobacter cloacae and Pantoea species, from unrelated patients and the hospital environment.

This report updates US Public Health Service recommendations for the management of healthcare personnel (HCP) who experience occupational exposure to blood and/or other body fluids that might contain human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Although the principles of exposure management remain unchanged, recommended HIV postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) regimens and the duration of HIV follow-up testing for exposed personnel have been updated. This report emphasizes the importance of primary prevention strategies, the prompt reporting and management of occupational exposures, adherence to recommended HIV PEP regimens when indicated for an exposure, expert consultation in management of exposures, follow-up of exposed HCP to improve adherence to PEP, and careful monitoring for adverse events related to treatment, as well as for virologic, immunologic, and serologic signs of infection. To ensure timely postexposure management and administration of HIV PEP, clinicians should consider occupational exposures as urgent medical concerns, and institutions should take steps to ensure that staff are aware of both the importance of and the institutional mechanisms available for reporting and seeking care for such exposures. The following is a summary of recommendations: (1) PEP is recommended when occupational exposures to HIV occur; (2) the HIV status of the exposure source patient should be determined, if possible, to guide need for HIV PEP; (3) PEP medication regimens should be started as soon as possible after occupational exposure to HIV, and they should be continued for a 4-week duration; (4) new recommendation-PEP medication regimens should contain 3 (or more) antiretroviral drugs (listed in Appendix A ) for all occupational exposures to HIV; (5) expert consultation is recommended for any occupational exposures to HIV and at a minimum for situations described in Box 1 ; (6) close follow-up for exposed personnel ( Box 2 ) should be provided that includes counseling, baseline and follow-up HIV testing, and monitoring for drug toxicity; follow-up appointments should begin within 72 hours of an HIV exposure; and (7) new recommendation-if a newer fourth-generation combination HIV p24 antigen-HIV antibody test is utilized for follow-up HIV testing of exposed HCP, HIV testing may be concluded 4 months after exposure ( Box 2 ); if a newer testing platform is not available, follow-up HIV testing is typically concluded 6 months after an HIV exposure.