As many countries begin to lift some of the restrictions to contain COVID-19 spread, lack of evidence of transmission in the school setting remains. We examined Irish notifications of SARS-CoV2 in the school setting before school closures on 12 March 2020 and identified no paediatric transmission. This adds to current evidence that children do not appear to be drivers of transmission, and we argue that reopening schools should be considered safe accompanied by certain measures.

ObjectivesCancer screening is a form of secondary prevention for a disease which is now the leading cause of death in France. Various socioeconomic indicators have been identified as potential factors for disparities in breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening uptake. We aimed to identify the socioeconomic inequalities, which persisted in screening uptake for these cancers, and to quantify these disparities over a 5-year period.SettingThe Cancer Barometer was a population-based-survey carried out in 2005 and 2010 in France.ParticipantsA randomly selected sample of participants aged 15–85 years (n=3820 in 2005 and n=3727 in 2010) were interviewed on their participation in breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening-programmes and their socioeconomic profile.Primary and secondary outcome measuresFor each type of screening programme, we calculated participation rates, OR and relative inequality indices (RII) for participation, derived from logistic regression of the following socioeconomic variables: income, education, occupation, employment and health insurance. Changes in participation between 2005 and 2010 were then analysed.ResultsParticipation rates for breast and colorectal screening increased significantly among the majority of socioeconomic categories, whereas for cervical cancer screening there were no significant changes between 2005 and 2010. RIIs for income remained significant for cervical smear in 2005 (RII=0.25, 95% CI 0.13 to 0.48) and in 2010 (RII=0.31, 95% CI 0.15 to 0.64). RIIs for education in mammography (RII=0.43, 95% CI 0.19 to 0.98) and cervical smear (RII=0.36, 95% CI 0.21 to 0.64) were significant in 2005 and remained significant for cervical smear (RII=0.40, 95% CI 0.22 to 0.74) in 2010.ConclusionsThere was a persistence of socioeconomic inequalities in the uptake of opportunistic cervical cancer screening. Conversely, organised screening programmes for breast and colorectal cancer saw a reduction in relative socioeconomic inequalities, even though the results were not statistically significant. The findings suggest that organised cancer screening programmes may have the potential to reduce socioeconomic disparities in participation.

International air travel has been highlighted as a concern since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic with respect to importation of cases. We summarise the available evidence for in-flight transmission of wild type SARS-CoV-2 during 2020, and for imported COVID-19 clusters to cause outbreaks. This paper provides a data baseline prior to the emergence of new mutations causing SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern, whose characteristics may increase the potential risk of in-flight transmission and imported outbreaks. The evidence on in-flight transmission of wild-type SARS-CoV-2 is limited, and is described in a small number of published reports. Most of the available evidence pertains to the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, during a period without non-pharmaceutical interventions such as distancing and in-flight mask wearing. There is considerable potential for outbreaks of COVID-19 from imported cases or clusters when public health guidance around quarantine of travellers and self-isolation of cases is not adhered to. Risks can be mitigated by measures such as: avoiding non-essential travel, targeted testing and quarantine of travellers from high incidence regions or regions of concern, managed quarantine processes, and protocols for rapid investigation and control of transmission from a possible variant of concern. Measures should be dynamically assessed and proportionate to the level of risk. Graphical abstract

BACKGROUND: In March 2011, the Department of Public Health East in Ireland were notified of two cases of TB in two prisoners sharing a cell. We define the resulting outbreak and highlight the role of public health and laboratory-based molecular epidemiology in mapping and control of a prison outbreak.METHODS: Cases were identified through clinical presentation, contact tracing, case-finding exercise or enhanced laboratory surveillance. Mycobacterium tuberculosis isolates were genotyped and underwent whole-genome sequencing (WGS).RESULTS: Of the 34 cases of TB linked to the outbreak, 27 were prisoners (79%), 4 prison officers (12%) and 3 community cases (9%). M. tuberculosis was isolated from 31 cases (culture positivity: 91%). A maximum of six single-nucleotide polymorphisms separated the isolates, with 22 being identical, suggestive of a highly infectious ‘super-spreader´ within the prison. Isolates belonged to the Beijing sub-lineage, and were susceptible to first-line anti-TB agents. A case-finding exercise incidentally detected a prisoner with multidrug-resistant TB. Of the 143 prison officers screened, 52% had latent TB infection. Litigation costs exceeded five million euros.CONCLUSION: This constitutes the largest prison outbreak of TB in Western Europe investigated using WGS. A robust prison entry TB screening and education programme is required to effect better TB control, and prevent future outbreaks and attendant litigation.

Background We describe the epidemiological trends and report and review the public health restrictions implemented during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Ireland. Methods The study reviewed confirmed cases of COVID-19 notified from 1 March to 18 July 2020. Data were obtained from the national COVID-19 Data Hub, the National Health Protection Surveillance Centre, the National Contact Management Programme and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Results A total of 25 617 cases were notified during the study period. Weekly cases and deaths peaked in mid-April 2020 at 5701 and 316, respectively. Mean number of close contacts per case was lowest at 0.7 in April, rising to 6.6 by July. Outbreak settings shifted from travel and workplace in March, to healthcare in April. Restrictions implemented on 12 March extended to full lockdown on 27 March. Phased relaxation of restrictions commenced 18 May. Effective suppression of community transmission of COVID-19 was achieved by June 2020. Conclusion Lockdown is a crude population-level restriction effective in controlling COVID-19. Phased relaxation of restrictions in Ireland, however, led to an immediate increase in mean number of contacts per case, which facilitates viral transmission unless individual-level restrictions are adhered to. This demonstrates a limitation of lockdown as a long-term mechanism of pandemic control.