The article maps out the multilayered legal governance of immigrant street vendors in Barcelona. The case study is used to develop the literature on crimmigration by suggesting better ways to account for the dynamic, asymmetric, and uneven legal intersections at play in immigration governance. Questioning the idea of a merger between immigration law and criminal law that scholars of crimmigration often imply, the article suggests that it is the heterogeneity and distinction between various legal regimes that is most productive and problematic in the governing of immigrants. The article offers the concept of interlegal jurisdictional games as an alternative point of entry to study these dynamics.

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Lacking an effective recruitment strategy and wanting to satisfy the demand for immigrant labour, Spanish authorities facilitated the entry of (mostly) Latin American ‘tourists’ in the early 2000s, knowing that many were migrants entering Spain to reside and work irregularly. This strategy is one of postponing control – a strategy of displacing some of the filtering work performed by borders and immigration selection across space and time. In this context, facilitating entry, policing the streets, regularizing ‘deserving immigrants’ and deporting ‘undesirable foreigners’ are analysed as complementary dimensions of a diffuse and flexible regime governing immigration through probation. It is argued that this displacement of borderwork allows for the creation of a probationary period during which the conduct of migrants is scrutinized and policed. This article describes the logics and practices of the various institutional actors involved in governing irregular migration in Spain, while paying attention to the role that discretion and competing interests play in the multi-scalar assessment of migrants’ desirability.