Following second-order election (SOE) theory, European elections entail accountability problems if voter mandates address national rather than European concerns. To investigate this issue, we conducted 107 semi-structured interviews with voters on Election Day in France, Germany and Poland and develop a typology of voter mandates. We argue that the quality of accountability links between electorate and EP varies with mandate types. While some mandates reflect the concerns of SOE theory expects, most establish meaningful accountability links, with many testifying to novel forms of EU politicization.

Different theories of politicization in EP elections entail very different conclusions for EU legitimacy. The somber predictions of second-order election (SOE) theory have been challenged by theories of polity politicization in recent years, but many scholars still believe policy politicization to be most desirable from a normative point of view. Despite its importance, there are few studies investigating the meaning citizens attach to their voting decision, which is crucial for disentangling different forms of politicization. We address this gap by choosing a qualitative and explorative research design, conducting 107 semi-structured interviews in France, Germany and Poland on the day of the 2019 EP elections. Our analysis of voter motivations provides evidence of SOE behavior, but also of European-level polity and policy politicization. The fact that voters are motivated by different forms of politicization challenges the hegemony of SOE theory. For some voters, EP elections are first order. This is good news for EP legitimacy.

The rule of law and democracy in the European Union (EU) are under great pressure. Indices measuring the rule of law show that attacks on it are on the rise. In the meantime, the EU has developed numerous instruments to defend the rule of law, but so far these have only been able to sanction, but not to prevent the dismantling of the rule of law. What both approaches have in common: they are more reactive than preventive. They can detect deterioration and sanction violations, but not anticipate them. In order to mitigate this shortcoming, we propose a new approach. It adds a preventive dimension to the debate on the rule of law in the EU: resilience. To this end, we identify factors that make the rule of law resilient to attacks and argue that this depends above all on its political, social and economic environment.