Este artículo cuestiona la metodología tradicional de elaboración de rankings de universidades y sugiere la elaboración de tablas de posiciones de universidades chilenas construidas sobre la base del ingreso de sus titulados, verificándose su validez estadística. Así, el concepto de “ranking” se acota al de categoría: universidades de primera, segunda y tercera clase. Los resultados arrojan las siguientes conclusiones: primero, existen importantes diferencias en el ingreso entre los titulados de las distintas universidades; segundo, el ranking y la magnitud de los diferenciales medios de ingresos dependen de la carrera considerada, reafirmando la necesidad de elaborar rankings separadamente por carrera, y, tercero, se observa que existe un premio por reputación entre tradicionales vs. derivadas, y entre privadas antiguas vs. privadas nuevas (para aquellas ubicadas en la Región Metropolitana y V Región).

Mortgage subsidies affect homeownership costs by reducing effective mortgage rates and increasing house prices. I show analytically the role of mortgage subsidies in determining house price changes, economic incidence, and efficiency costs using a theoretical framework for applied welfare analysis. I derive simple expressions for these effects, as functions of reduced-form sufficient statistics, which I use to measure the effects from eliminating mortgage deductions. My main results characterize the distributional impact of mortgage subsidies among buyers and owners and how house price responses attenuate efficiency losses. My results provide broader methodological insights into the welfare analysis of credit policies.JEL classification: H22, R21, R28.

We present a model where endogenous liquidity generates a feedback loop between secondary market liquidity and firms' financing decisions in primary markets. The model features two key frictions: a costly state verification problem in primary markets, and search frictions in over-the-counter secondary markets. Our concept of liquidity depends endogenously on illiquid assets put up for sale relative to the resources available for buying those assets in the secondary market. Liquidity determines the liquidity premium, which affects issuance in the primary market, and this effect feeds back into secondary market liquidity by changing the composition of investors' portfolios. We show that the privately optimal allocations are inefficient because investors and firms fail to internalize how their behavior affects secondary market liquidity. These inefficiencies are established analytically through a set of wedge expressions for key efficiency margins. Our analysis provides a rationale for the effect of quantitative easing on secondary and primary capital markets and the real economy.