Summary Replay of behavioral sequences in the hippocampus during sharp-wave-ripple-complexes (SWRs) provides a potential mechanism for memory consolidation and the learning of knowledge structures. Current hypotheses imply that replay should straightforwardly reflect recent experience. However, we find these hypotheses to be incompatible with the content of replay on a task with two distinct behavioral sequences (A&B). We observed forward and backward replay of B even when rats had been performing A for >10 minutes. Furthermore, replay of non-local sequence B occurred more often when B was infrequently experienced. Neither forward nor backward sequences preferentially represented highly-experienced trajectories within a session. Additionally, we observed the construction of never-experienced novel-path sequences. These observations challenge the idea that sequence activation during SWRs is a simple replay of recent experience. Instead, replay reflected all physically available trajectories within the environment, suggesting a potential role in active learning and maintenance of the cognitive map.

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The encoding and storage of experience by the hippocampus is essential for the formation of episodic memories and the transformation of individual experiences into semantic structures such as maps and schemas. The rodent hippocampus compresses ongoing experience into repeating theta sequences, but the factors determining the content of theta sequences are not understood. Here we first show that the spatial paths represented by theta sequences in rats extend farther in front of the rat during acceleration and higher running speeds and begin farther behind the rat during deceleration. Second, the length of the path is directly related to the length of the theta cycle and the number of gamma cycles in it. Finally, theta sequences represent the environment in segments or ‘chunks’. These results imply that information encoded in theta sequences is subject to powerful modulation by behavior and task variables. Furthermore, these findings suggest a potential mechanism for the cognitive ‘chunking’ of experience.

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