The aim of this work is to describe a tool (Spi2Java) that automatically generates Java code implementing cryptographic protocols described in the formal specification language spi calculus. Spi2Java is part of a set of tools for spi calculus, also including a pre-processor, a parser, and a security analyzer. The latter can formally analyze protocols and detect protocol flaws. When a protocol has been analyzed and an adequate confidence about its correctness has been reached, Spi2Java can generate a corresponding correct Java implementation of the protocol, thus dramatically reducing the risk of introducing security flaws in the coding phase. 1 Spi2Java uses some typographic conventions respect to the original spi calculus

In this paper we present an efficient countermeasure against stack smashing attacks. Our countermeasure does not rely on secret values (such as canaries) and protects against attacks that are not addressed by state-of-the-art countermeasures. Our technique splits the standard stack into multiple stacks. The allocation of data types to one of the stacks is based on the chances that a specific data element is either a target of attacks and/or an attack vector. We have implemented our solution in a C-compiler for Linux. The evaluation shows that the overhead of using our countermeasure is negligible.

This paper presents JavaSPI, a "model-driven" development framework that allows the user to reliably develop security protocol implementations in Java, starting from abstract models that can be verified formally. The main novelty of this approach stands in the use of Java as both a modeling language and the implementation language. By using the SSL handshake protocol as a reference example, this paper illustrates the JavaSPI framework.

In modern factories, personal computers are starting to replace traditional Programmable Logic Controllers, due to cost and flexibility reasons, and also because their operating systems now support programming environments even suitable for demanding real-time applications. These characteristics, as well as the ready availability of many software packages covering any kind of needs, have made the introduction of PC-based devices at the factory field level especially attractive.However, this approach has a profound influence on the extent of threats that a factory computing infrastructure shall be prepared to deal with. In fact, industrial personal computers share the same kinds of vulnerabilities with their office automation counterparts. Then, their introduction increases the risk of cyberattacks.As the complexity of the network grows, the problem rapidly becomes hard to tackle by hand, due to the subtle and unforeseen interactions that may occur among apparently unrelated vulnerabilities, thus bearing the focus on the full automation of the analysis. Going into this direction, this paper presents a software tool that, given an accurate and machine-readable description of vulnerabilities, detects whether or not they are of concern and evaluates consequences in the context of a factory network.

In order to perform a successful attack on a network, an intruder must know various penetration techniques, also known as exploits. In general, an exploit can be successful only if some pre-conditions are true. Such conditions may involve the presence of vulnerable programs and/or specific software configurations, as well as certain attacker privileges on hosts and network reachability. When an exploit has success, it usually induces a new set of conditions within the network (post-conditions), such as new attacker privileges, and increased connectivity. Therefore, a network attack can be made of a series of exploits that gradually increase the attacker "power" on the network, until some final goal has been reached or the whole network has been compromised. Reaching such a goal is possible because of dependencies among exploits in terms of pre-and post-conditions. This paper describes how the OVAL language, originally aimed at describing how to check for the existence of vulnerabilities on hosts, can be enhanced to allow automatic reasoning for precisely determining the possible chains of exploits that an attacker could use to compromise the hosts in the network. Moreover, the paper shows how the description of vulnerabilities can be enriched to allow performing risk analysis, so as to determine the impact of attackers on the network, as well as the likelihood of attacks.