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This article critically examines the practice, methods, and regulation of cross‐border police cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Despite legal and political divisions, police cooperation has survived and flourished in recent years especially among police officers on the ground. By comparison, the development of transparent regulatory and accountability structures and processes has been disappointing. While there have been domestic initiatives at the intergovernmental and legislative levels, these have tended to emphasize the centrality of direct engagement between the police chiefs and senior civil servants at the expense of formal transparent procedures. EU instruments have been marginalized as the police forces and their administrations prefer informal networks and force‐to‐force agreements which, it is argued, shield cross‐border police cooperation from standards of transparency, oversight, and accountability which are essential to its legitimacy. They also highlight the limitations of the current EU legislative approach to cross‐border police cooperation.

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Twenty years after Ireland adopted an external supervisory board model to promote public confidence in the handling of complaints against the police (the Garda Síochána), it had to replace it with a cross between the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the Independent Police Complaints Commission in England and Wales. This paper examines the nature and scale of the board's failure and offers a critique of the internal and external factors responsible. It focuses, in particular, on how the police and the government, acting separately and in combination, managed to smother the potential of the supervisory board model. It also offers insights into how the board contributed to its own failure. The paper concludes by drawing attention to the fact that several of these negative forces can also be active in the new complaints procedure that commenced operations in 2007.