Twenty years of handling police complaints in Ireland: a critical assessment of the supervisory board model

Abstract

Twenty years after Ireland adopted an external supervisory board model to promote public confidence in the handling of complaints against the police (the Garda Síochána), it had to replace it with a cross between the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the Independent Police Complaints Commission in England and Wales. This paper examines the nature and scale of the board's failure and offers a critique of the internal and external factors responsible. It focuses, in particular, on how the police and the government, acting separately and in combination, managed to smother the potential of the supervisory board model. It also offers insights into how the board contributed to its own failure. The paper concludes by drawing attention to the fact that several of these negative forces can also be active in the new complaints procedure that commenced operations in 2007.

Current developments in police governance and accountability in Ireland

“…Concerns also exist that the body will be under-resourced, like its predecessor, which was forced on occasion to close due to a lack of resources [49].…”

Police governance and accountability: overview of current issues

“…Unlike courts, with which they are often confused, the inquiries do not offer direct remedies for police corruption and abuse, or make findings of innocence 26 The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission could potentially handle all investigations itself, but a large number are being "leased back" to the police to conduct the investigations. The Commission can choose whether or not to supervise such investigations [50,254]. 27 It should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that where Convention rights have been breached it would also be a breach of the right to an effective remedy not to hold an independent investigation: Govell v. UK [1998] EHRLR 101.…”