This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as (e.g.) tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while (1) merely preparing, (2) not taking any steps, and (3) the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some frogs (such as tadpoles) are immature frogs, some actions (such as intentions) are immature actions.

Recent work by Joseph Raz, Niko Kolodny, and Sergio Tenenbaum suggest that there are no normative constraints peculiar to intentions as such. Such constraints are a myth. We can understand the rationality of intention without positing that intention is a mental state. I argue that, further, we can understand the descriptive nature of intention (i.e., its role in intrapersonal coordination) without positing that intention is a mental state. Such a posit is itself a myth. Instead, intention is an action with certain characteristic sub-actions that play a coordinating role.

What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.

In this book, Dancy extends his theory of normative reasons to give a neo-Aristotelian account of practical reasoning by way of a novel account of reasoning in general. According to neo-Aristotelianism, 'action is as direct, as unmediated a response to reasoning as belief can be' (p. 42). Just as theoretical reasoning starts from one's beliefs and leads, directly, to the formation or abandonment of a belief, practical reasoning starts from one's beliefs and leads, directly, to the formation or abandonment of an action. This stands in opposition to accounts according to which practical reasoning starts and ends with normative beliefs or intentions or only ends with action indirectly (via some motivational state). Dancy argues for this in three major moves. First, he dismantles arguments against neo-Aristotelianism. Second, he gives an account of reasoning in general and uses this account to give more specific accounts of formal and non-formal theoretical reasoning, moral reasoning, and non-instrumental and instrumental practical reasoning. Third, he argues that these specific accounts are better than prevailing accountsthe major complaint throughout being that the prevailing accounts cannot give an adequate explanation of how the premises 'make a case' for the conclusion. The strongest parts of the book are where Dancy dismantles the arguments against neo-Aristotelianism. (This happens primarily in chapters 1, 8, and 9.) One exits the book thinking that neo-Aristotelianism really should be taken more seriously. But I won't rehearse those arguments here. Instead, I want to lay out Dancy's accounts. I will gloss over a lot of important details and qualifications for the sake of brevity. For Dancy, reasoning is a process. In general, this process involves six major elements: beliefs (Bn), states of affairs (Sn), a response-type (R), a response-token (r), a dependence relation (D), and a favouring relation (F). The account is this: Reasoning in general: in a non-defective case of reasoning, 1. states of affairs (Sn) represented by one's beliefs (Bn) favour (F) a response-type (R), and 2. one responds (r) in the way favoured because (D) of 1. The broad distinction between the theoretical and the practical is simply a difference in response (R, and correspondingly r). In theoretical reasoning, the response is believing. In practical reasoning, the response is acting. So, we get the following two accounts: Theoretical reasoning: in a non-defective case of theoretical reasoning, 1. states of affairs represented by one's beliefs favour believing in a certain way, and